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KOREAN CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND 
THE HERMENEUTICS OF ACTION: 
NURTURING INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The most pressing contemporary problems of Christian religious education 
are inextricably related to issues of ‘epistemic ontology,’ ‘hermeneutics,’ 
‘postmodernism,’ and the ‘epistemic shift’ away from the classical philosophical 
dualisms of subject/object, mind/body, rationality/irrationality, and reason/faith.  
This is especially true when one considers impasses encountered in attempts to 
overcome intergenerational rifts in the Korean Protestant community. 
Since the early twentieth century, fundamental and Minjung theology have 
determined the state of Christian religious education in Korea and questions of 
pedagogical application in Korean Christian religious education have become 
battles between fundamental pedagogy (seen as ‘doctrine’) and Minjung 
pedagogy (seen as ‘messianic political praxis’). 
Fundamental theology has largely been influenced by scientific thought 
and philosophical positivism and the formulation and application of its pedagogy. 
Minjung theology has been influenced by a variety of liberation struggles on 
behalf of the Minjung (varyingly translated as ‘the masses,’ ‘people,’ or ‘the 
oppressed’), resulting in a pedagogy that places stress on political expression. 
Postmodernism for some commentators occasions ‘a crisis of reason’ 
because it challenges foundational approaches to knowledge and morality and 
the ahistorical justifications of many social institutions (Peters and Lankshear 
1996, 3).  Postmodern thought is marked by a celebration of cultural pluralism 
and relativism and postmodern culture is nurtured by contemporary paganism, 
syncretism, information technologies, entertainment industries, and consumerism 
in general. 
In some ways, the postmodern rejection of universal rationality and meta-
narratives in favor of particular stories may appear to be a welcome development 
as possibilities of de-westernization.  Nevertheless, many alleged postmodern 
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pedagogies still operate within, and are fueled by, unacceptable modern dualities. 
It is my contention that because the older generations (that I will later call 
the Builder and Boomer Generations) have their value systems and faith based 
on the two dominant pedagogies (fundamental and Minjung) of the Korean 
Protestant community, they cannot understand and adjust to the paradigm shift in 
culture and society that marks the postmodern era. 
 Most Christian religious educators in position of authority at universities, 
seminaries, and in churches are members of these generations.  As such, the 
transmission of their values and thoughts to theology students, ministers-in-
training, and to their congregations is a transmission varyingly marked by their 
own education and participation in the paradigmatic ways of these theologies and 
pedagogies – including, for example, the view that education is best described as 
the transmission of knowledge and value. 
  I believe that all of these educators will be able to learn from a redefining 
of the notions of understanding and relationship as they interact with a variety of 
generations in their congregations and with those members of younger 
generations who are in their classrooms.  Towards the end of this thesis, 
suggestions will be made as to how Christian religious educators can introduce 
into both their classrooms and their congregations changes that are in keeping 
with the redefinitions of understanding and relationship offered herein. 
Many binary oppositions mark theologies, philosophies, and pedagogies 
nurtured under modernism – subject vs. object; knowledge vs. opinion; rationality 
vs. mob psychology; science vs. non-science; cognition vs. emotion; theory vs. 
imagination; necessity vs. contingency; center vs. periphery; collective vs. 
individual.  It is my belief that understanding between generations, especially 
within the Korean Protestant community, has in large part been forestalled 
because of the acceptance of such oppositions by fundamental and Minjung 
theology.  For example, the tendency of both fundamental pedagogy and Minjung 
pedagogy, to marginalize groups of youth into ‘sub-cultural groups’ or ‘counter-
cultures’ is a tendency fueled by such dichotomors thinking that must be avoided. 
Although it is true that Minjung pedagogy has, since the 1960s, taken into 
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account the role of youth culture, that pedagogy still strengthens additional 
dualities of modernism such as ‘the oppressor/the oppressed,’ ‘enlightenment/ 
confusion,’ and ‘adult/youth.’  Indeed, both fundamental pedagogy and Minjung 
pedagogy are largely still concerned, especially through their emphasis on the 
training of ‘elders,’ about the older generations. 
In general, fundamental pedagogy has the goal of doctrinal conformity 
while Minjung pedagogy has the goal of socio-political liberation.  However, both 
pedagogies’ acceptance of the above binary oppositions preclude the 
entertaining of notions of understanding and notions of doxastic and 
interpersonal relationships necessary in overcoming intergenerational rift.  
Having to choose between these two pedagogies leaves the Korean Protestant 
community unable to be responsibly concerned about the cultural offerings of all 
generations. 
It is my contention that Christian religious educators need an alternative to 
both fundamental and Minjung pedagogies and, more specifically, a new 
perspective on the intersection of the concepts of understanding and 
relationships.  Such a perspective, I believe, must be found if they are to 
adequately assess what differences between generations exist and how those 
differences are best articulated.  It is also necessary if they are to find 
alternatives to assist young and old alike in resolving their differences and in 
nurturing valued relationships. 
All generations can be seen as addressing reality and translating it into a 
language that makes sense to them.  This task is called ‘hermeneutics’ and it is 
about gaining understanding of the world and people in it.  The ‘hermeneutic line’ 
that runs throughout this paper has been developed for a variety of reasons.  
Historically, the hermeneutic tradition is one that has tried to underline the 
important connection between enculturation and education, a connection that I 
believe is integral to Koreans of all ages gaining a sense of their own ‘private’ 
development as necessarily involving the self-understanding and growth of 
others.  Moreover, the hermeneutic tradition has offered many resources to those 
educators wishing to argue against the positivistic reduction of knowledge, 
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understanding, and reason to science, explanatory theory, and formal rationality 
respectively.  A study of hermeneutics in general has much to offer Christian 
religious educators in their varied attempts to work free of the positivistic dualities 
that still shape fundamental theology and Minjung theology. 
Fundamental and Minjung theologians make assumptions about how 
people come to understand the world, and they have tried to formalize such 
alleged ‘methods’ through pedagogical practice.  Their successes in such 
practice have reified and entrenched in people’s minds certain relationships 
between concepts and have ‘naturalized’ in our interpersonal behavior certain 
relationships between people. 
The goal of this thesis is to undo those assumptions about understanding 
and the doxastic and social relationships that are concomitant with those 
assumptions, while offering a different way of construing understanding that is 
conducive to allowing Christian religious educators to move forward in their work, 
especially as that work concerns intergenerational strife. 
This rewriting of our notions of understanding and relationship will be in a 
direction wherein the distinctions between faith, knowledge, self-understanding, 
enculturation, and ethical choice are blurred.  Accordingly, this thesis champions 
many of those interdisciplinary approaches to the study of philosophy, theology, 
and education that have been influenced by both traditional hermeneutics and its 
radical, deconstructive re-positionings.  The thesis also attempts to reflexively 
deploy such approaches throughout. 
The first chapter provides Christian religious educators with some 
resources for articulating the characteristics of, and the conflicts between, the 
older generations and those who have been called Generation Xers.  It offers 
some conclusions I have drawn from an informal research project in which I 
attempted to evaluate the differences in the Christian world-view between 
Boomers and Generation Xers in the Korean Protestant church. 
Through this research, I shought to attune my ears more closely to the 
concerns of Generation X in particular, so that I would have their voices in mind 
as I explored the philosophical literature for insights into how intergenerational 
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relationships could be nurtured.  It was in this context that I realized the 
continued significance of the Korean notion of Chong.  This notion has been very 
influential throughout much of Korean history and remains so to this day.  
Because of its ‘traditionalness,’ however, it has been ignored by both 
fundamental and Minjung pedagogy.  I believe that consideration of it is 
unavoidable for a variety of reasons.  It plays an important part in the 
understanding and relationships of most Koreans and offers a pragmatic point of 
reference for many of the ideas that are to be discussed throughout the thesis.  It 
is also a notion that is divided against itself, and thus offers a similar reference 
point for coming to terms with some of the postmodern criticisms of binary 
oppositions.  Most importantly, it is a notion that Generation Xers, in spite of 
denials by their elders, continue to be influenced by, and is thus obviously 
important for educators seeking to mediate between different generations. 
The second chapter opens by offering an historical overview of the 
interplay between fundamental and Minjung theology and pedagogy in Korea and 
criticizes the role therein of positivism and objectivism.  It also critically assesses 
the nature of Christian religious education and what constitutes a philosophical 
examination of this field of endeavor. 
The work of Gadamer has been the most influential representation of 
traditional hermeneutics over the last several decades and the work of Caputo 
constitutes a very fertile body of work that both radically questions Gadamerian 
assumptions while extending Gadamer’s hermeneutic focus on the inextricable 
connections between our understanding and our relationships with others. 
Chapters three and four respectively engage educational discourses on 
faith, knowledge, and ethical action through a discussion of Gadamer’s 
‘philosophical hermeneutics,’ and Caputo’s radical questioning of many of the 
assumptions thereof.  Because of the influence of Habermas’ ‘critical 
hermeneutics,’ and because it offers an occasion to assess what constitutes a 
politically radical questioning of hermeneutics, my assessment of Gadamer’s 
work at the end of chapter three will include some reflection on both Habermas’ 
thoughts and, by way of introduction to Caputo, a presentation of Caputo’s 
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criticism of Habermas.  The influence of Derrida and deconstruction on Caputo’s 
‘radical hermeneutics’ is brought into the hermeneutical line that runs throughout 
this paper, rather than, as it often is, presented as the entirely Other to 
hermeneutics. 
In chapter five, I shall offer critical overviews of fundamental and Minjung 
pedagogy, Gadamer’s and Habermas’ work on understanding and relationships, 
and Caputo’s flux model, specifying what each model can offer Christian religious 
educators interested in overcoming generational rifts in the Korean Protestant 
community.  Specifically, I will show how Caputo’s flux model must be 
supplemented by the interpersonal notions of care and sensitivity to suffering if 
we are to develop a model of understanding and relationship that emphasizes the 
‘doing of truth’ as a cooperative venture marked by responsibility and mutual 
guidance.  I believe that ‘doing the truth’ is a phronesis for contemporary times.  It 
reflexively highlights both the working with people in specific situations, at 
specific times, with specific resources at hand, towards specific goals, and how 
that working changes our understanding of the world and the relationships 
between all of us. 
In the conclusion, I will suggest how what has been learned throughout the 
thesis can be used to reshape the relationships between different generations 
and between ourselves as Christian religious educators and the communities 
within which we work. 
I will call those suggestions ‘pragmatic,’ and I believe that it is imperative 
at the outset to state as to what is in involved in my use of this term.  By 
‘pragmatic,’ I do not mean ‘the application of theory.’  I mean something more 
akin to what others may call ‘praxis’ – a going forth into the world that is informed 
by and informs our valuational and doxastic appropriations of the world.  There is 
no smooth line running from some distinct thing called theory to something else 
equally distinct called practice.  We can never say in advance what practices 
‘flow’ from our theory.  Such a way of construing things is a leftover from a vision 
of the world that gives precedence to theory.  Much of this paper is a defence of 
the idea that alleged problems between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ are not so much 
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solved but rather dissolved when we act in the world.  The course of our actions 
cannot be thoroughly delineated in advance by theory.  As I have mentioned 
above, we can only offer suggestions as to how we might proceed in the 
circumstances in which we find ourselves. 
My redefinitions of what constitutes understanding and relationships bring 
into question perhaps the most prominent philosophical dualism – that between 
theory and practice.  They do this through bringing Christian religious educators 
to a point where the furtherance of thought on how forms of understanding and 
relationships are possible between groups of people can only be affected through 
engaging those very people and the lives they live.  Such an engagement is not 
so much one dictated by theory, as it is one that accepts the necessity of various 
kinds of doing. 
The kinds of praxis proposed do not have a necessary theoretical 
underpinning.  But that is one of the things that Christian religious educators must 
learn to appreciate – that putting the right foot forward is often a step of faith.  
Nevertheless, such educators do find themselves working in some, rather than 
other, contexts.  Reformulating curriculum initially involves working within 
curriculum that is in place, as reformulating the kinds of relationships that 
constitute our congregations involves working with congregations that already 
exist.  As such, suggestions on what to do are best formulated with such givens 
in mind. 
Throughout this thesis, we will gradually come to see that our 
interpretations of the world require acting with courage.  They require what 
Caputo has called ‘doing the truth.’  Following the hermeneutical line that runs 
throughout the chapters necessitates not only a study of the contingencies that 
constitute the world of Korean Christian religious educators, but also a doing to 
change those contingencies.  Inevitably, this thesis supports a fusing of our 
understanding, our being, and our doing. 
The hermeneutical position defended in this thesis is one that challenges 
the assumption that one can neatly separate our engagements with the world 
from our understanding of it, and thus supports the idea that the doing of truth is 
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one with our understanding of it.  This position also challenges the idea that there 
is a thing called ‘private’ truth and understanding which is acquired through 
possessing at the level of theory aspects of the world that were at one time 
‘other,’ beyond our grasp, our ‘apprehension.’ 
The position defended herein is one that will hopefully enable appreciation 
that all generations are in the making, and that ‘what is’ is very much a becoming.  
It is defended in an attempt to help Christian religious educators help those 
around them – those with whom they must commune – come to realize where 
they might step forward into the world.  The hermeneutical line that weaves 
throughout this thesis inevitably gives strength to the idea that a stepping forward 
together is how all of us engage our responsibilities towards others, enhance our 
understanding, and help the generation of truth. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
KOREAN CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND 
THE GENERATION GAP 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER II 
 
CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN KOREA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The term ‘Christian education’ in Korea is strongly associated with 
American Protestant missionary work.  It is often claimed that it now has some 
rather negative connotations, carrying overtones of indoctrination or cultural 
imperialism.  In the following sections, I will explain why I prefer the term 
‘Christian religious education’ to ‘Christian education.’  As we will come to see, 
‘Christian education’ highlights the transfer of received doctrine from those in 
position of church authority to students.  On the other hand, ‘Christian religious 
education’ implies the deepening of a person’s Christian beliefs, attitudes, values, 
and dispositions to act in a Christian way.  It is also more directly connotative of 
what I see as the more immediate and interrelated pedagogical tasks of 
educating, ‘by God's grace, for a lived Christian faith’ (Astley 1994, 7-9; Groome 
1991, 14).   
Attention must initially be given, however, to the many tensions that exist 
between fundamental theology and Minjung theology in Korea.   In this chapter, I 
will first explore those tensions through an overview of significant factors in 
Korean history since the 1880s that have influenced the relationship between 
theology and Christian education and that continue to have ramifications on the 
course of contemporary pedagogy in Korea.  Such factors are not internal to the 
history of theology.  They include many of a political, economic, and cultural 
nature that were (and are) inextricably bound up with the attempts by specific 
groups of Korean men and women to bring change and redefinition to their lives. 
 Attention will be given to the notions of understanding sponsored by 
fundamental and Minjung theology and the resultant doxastic and interpersonal 
relationships entrenched by their pedagogies. 
I will then discuss the significance of the term ‘Christian religious 
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education’ in Korea as opposed to that of ‘Christian education,’ and demonstrate 
how the former can help educators better realize the need people have for 
understanding the world, bettering their relationships with others, and for making 
positive changes in their lives. 
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I.  THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CHRISTIAN  
    EDUCATION IN KOREA 
 
The Place of Christianity in Korea 
 
Korea is a multi-religious society, with a variety of religions and 
denominations thereof continuing to exert influence.  As we learn from the 
Population Census released in 1995 by the Korea National Statistics Office, of 
the fifty-seven percent of the Korean population calling themselves religious, 
about 10,320,000 are Buddhists, 8,760,000 are Protestants, 2,950,000 are 
Catholics and 210,000 are Confucians (Kim 2002, 153). 
Traditionally, Protestant missionary work has been fueled by the 
principles of modernism.  Underlying virtually all of the Protestant mission efforts 
has been the assumption of the superiority of the West.  As a result, it was the 
task of early missionaries to promulgate Western science and technology, 
Western medicine, Western education, Western social welfare, and Western 
ideas of democracy.  It was assumed that adoption of these Western elements by 
other peoples and cultures would lead to a better life and that Protestant 
missionary work was part of that development. 
In Korea, Protestant missions have over one hundred and twenty years of 
history.  In recent years, attention has been given to the phenomenal nascent 
growth of Protestant churches there (Schrotenboer 1983, 118).  From 802 in 
1895, the number of Protestant church members skyrocketed to 167,352 in 1910 
(J. Kim 1996, 106).  Methodist and Presbyterian churches accounted for most of 
this growth, with the number of adult baptized communicants increasing from 
2,773 in 1904 to 13,939 in 1910 and the numbers of adherents increasing from 
23,700 to 107,717 (J. Kim 1996, 106). 
Many scholars are in agreement with Min’s remarks on the effect and 
achievement of Christian education and on how it has influenced Korean culture 
and life.  Min claims that:  
 
First, Christian education breaks down superstitions… Secondly, Christian 
education was of great service in the spread of the Korean language and 
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literature. Thirdly, Christian education… played a central role in aiding the 
reception of modern culture, establishing schools, conveying the latest in 
medical science, importing the art of modern printing, conveying the new 
music, teaching the community life forms like meeting for recreation… 
Fourthly, it released women from housework and enabled them to meet 
together. Equality between man and woman and the abolition of the 
concubine system elevated the social state of women (Min 1981, 58). 
 
As we are about to see, however, the story is not quite that simple or positive. 
 
Between Fundamentalist Doctrine and Political 
Consciousness:  Missionary Work in Korea to 1960 
 
The so-called Opening Period (1876–1910)1 that marks the beginnings of 
modernism in Korea also marks the initial penetration into Korea of Christianity.  
As soon as the Opening Period began, some individuals in the West became 
interested in Korea, dispatching Christian missionaries. 
While the official date given for the beginning of the Roman Catholic 
missions to Korean is 1784, the Protestant missionary who is known to have 
made efforts to begin the work of evangelism in Korean was Carl Friedrich 
Augustus Gutzlaff in 1832 (J. Kim 1996, 91). 
Prior to the Opening Period, towards the end of the Chosun Dynasty, civic 
ministers wielded authority and power, and tyrannized through Taewon-Koon, or 
Hae-eung Lee, who, although not a legitimate king, had taken control of the 
power given his son, King Kojong, at twelve years of age (Kim 2002, 20). 
The western nations, having already experienced industrial revolutions, 
were trying to secure resources for their capitalist economies and began to 
penetrate into Chosun, and Taewon-Koon, attempting to strengthen the 
centralization of the Chosun Dynasty, rejected their requests for trade.  Because 
it was Western, Roman Catholicism was perceived as a threat (Byon 1993, 421-
423).  Taewon-Koon was responsible for the killing of two Korean religious  
                                                 
1  The word ‘opening’ is about the growth of intellectual and social movements at the end of the 
Chosun Dynasty intent upon promoting modernism in Korea using the civilization of the West as an 
example. There are some differences of opinions among scholars about the years that define the Korean 
Opening Period. Ji-hoon Cho (1963, 9) argues for 1884 to 1920 and Hyun-hee Lee (1976, 11) for 1876 to 
1905. The Korean Opening period is considered in this paper to stretch from 1876 to 1910. 
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leaders – Bong-ju Hong and Jong-nam Nam – as well as nine others, including 
French missionaries, and ordered state authorities to slaughter a number of 
Catholics in 1866.  Because of this, the French diplomatic minister reconnoitered 
from Incheon and Kanghwa Island to Yanghwajin with eight ships and occupied 
parts of Kanghwa Isalnad, protesting the massacre of the missionaries (Koak 
1975, 225). 
Accompanying General Sherman on an American merchant ship coming 
into the upper Daedong River in 1866, a Pastor Thomas and some crewmen 
were killed by government forces.  In 1871, the American government sent 
warships to Kanghwa Island in order to force the Korean government to sign a 
treaty as well as rebuke it for the ‘Shinmi-Yangyo’ (‘foreign disturbance’) event.  
Against such a continuing policy of seclusion by Taewon-Koon, forces 
formed opposite to his government demanding freer trade.  He was finally 
overthrown by the forces of Queen Minbi, who made reforms, one of which was 
the policy of opening a port (Byon 1993, 426). 
While France and America failed to open a port under the Chosun 
Dynasty, Japan compelled Korea to sign the unequal Pyungia treaty2 in 1876. 
Although this treaty was the precedent for further mutual treaties between Korean 
and Japan and ones with Europe and the U.S.A., its forced nature formed the 
basis of a Korean nationalism (Ha 1976, 17). 
In 1876 Sang-yoon Suh, who was one of the first Korean Protestant 
converts in Manchuria, began to translate the Gospel of Luke from Chinese 
characters into Korean script with other missionaries.  Feeling that native 
evangelists were more effective than Western missionaries could be, he laid 
great emphasis on colporteur work.  After many attempts to bring the Scripture 
into the difficult political situation of Korea, Sang-yoon Suh returned to his native 
village of Sorai on the West coast of Korea, and there he preached and 
established the first Korean Protestant congregation (J. Kim 1996, 92). 
                                                 
2  Although the terms of this treaty were very unfavourable to Korea economically, politically, 
and militarily, it “holds great historical significance for Korea because it brought Korea for the first time 
out onto the international stage” (Lee 1984, 269). 
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With such an example in mind, John T. Kim argues that Korean 
Protestant Christians in many ways preceded Western missionaries in 
establishing the church in their country.  It is Kim’s belief that there is some truth 
in the claim that “the church was already established before the first official 
Protestant missionary ever set foot in Korea in 1884” (J. Kim 1996, 94). 
In the beginning of the Protestant missions in Korea, direct preaching to 
the common people was not allowed.  The missionaries adopted the policy of 
non-aggressive or indirect evangelistic activity of modern Western Christian 
education through schools founded by Protestant missionaries in the 1880s.  
Mission schools as a representative of Christian education began to be 
established in Korea.  The primary reasons for their establishment were to preach 
the gospel through education, to train religious workers, and to free Korean 
people from ‘ignorance.’  With these purposes, 823 schools, including the 
prominent ones of Baejae, Ewha, and Kyungshin, were established by 19103(J. 
Kim 1996, 157). 
As an example of the early Protestant mission school one might look at 
Ewha Girl’s School (1886) which, based on the spirit of the equality of the sexes, 
provided the first chance for females to get a proper education (Moon 1985, 10; 
Conrow 1956, 4).  A modern system of education was established at Ewha in 
1900.  The subjects and the course of study were as follows (Jung 1967, 35-38; 
Conrow 1956, 11-21): 
 
Table 2 
Curriculum in 1904 of Ewha Girl’s School 
 
 
Curriculum 
 
 
Subjects  
Course 1 
H/
W 
 
Course 2 
H/
W
 
Course 3 
H/ 
W 
 
Course 4 
H/
W
Korean Gospel in 
Korean 
5 Christian 
Ethics 
5 Ethics 5 Christian 
Ethics 
5 
                                                 
3  Kim claims that of the remaining 2,250 private school in Korea in 1910, 1,402 were Chinese 
character learning institutes and 25 were secular modern schools (J. Kim 1996, 157); Ki-bail Lee puts the 
number of private schools “before Korea fell completely under Japanese colonial domination” at “some 
3,000” (Lee 1984, 332). 
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Chinese Great 
Learning 
5 Analects of 
Confucianism
5 Analects of 
Confucianism
5 Analects of 
Confucianism
5 
Math Number, 
Fraction 
4 Decimal 
Abacus 
4 Comparison
 
4 Algebra 5 
History4 Chosun 1 Koguryo, 
Paeche, Shila
1 Koryo 1 History of 
America 
1 
Geography  1 Korean 
Geography 
1 Foreign 
Geography 
2 American 
Geography 
2 
Bible Bible 1 Bible 1 Bible 1 Bible 1 
English English 5 English 5 English 5 English 5 
Science   Animal; Plant 1 Physics 2 Chemistry 3 
Drawing Picture 1 Picture 1 Reference 1   
 
Physiology 
Physiology 
Sanitation 
1 Home 
Sanitation 
1 Skill of 
Rearing 
Infants 
2 Skill of 
Rearing 
Infants 
1 
Music A Single 
Sound 
Change 
1 Instrumental
Music 
1 Instrumental 
Music 
5 Instrumental
Music 
1 
 
Because the content of many of these subjects – especially English and 
Bible Study – ran against that of traditional Korean education, such institutions 
were “at first the target of aversion on the part of the traditional gentry class and 
the first students consisted mainly of orphans or lower class converts” (J. Kim 
1996, 157). 
In other words, the opportunities that the missionaries made available 
through education were for both girls (who were still considered by many 
Koreans to be inferior creatures) and, later, boys of the Minjung.  The sons of the 
yang-ban (the upper social class) were not attracted to the school (Moon 1985, 
10-11).  Later, however, the school did attract the attention of the elite and 
produced many leading figures, not only in Christian movements, but also in 
social and political movements, especially those movements that sought 
independence from Japan. 
The unwitting role of Japan in the history of Christianity in Korea cannot be 
underestimated.  Protestant Christianity came to Korea at a critical and 
providential time in the nation’s social and political response to the rising empire 
                                                 
4  For a good description of the various kingdoms that have dominated Korean history,  see Lee, 
Ki-baik. A New History of Korea. trans. Edward W. Wanger & Edward J. Shultz (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1984), 36-65. 
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of Japan.  Choo Chai-young claims that during the so-called Formative Period of 
the Church (1880-1919), Christian missionaries helped in the struggle for 
independence and human rights.  He argues that: 
 
[t]he main purpose of Korean Christianity was to achieve independence 
from Japanese occupation and human rights for the Korean people. The 
people were enlightened and inspired by the analyses of current situations 
and problems in the “Independence Newspaper” stirred up against the 
maladministration and illegal judgments of government officials (Choo 
1981, 69-70). 
 
Christianity came as something new to the people in times of insecurity 
and was therefore easily accepted (J. Kim 1996, 96).  The initial identification of 
Christianity with modernity was also of significant importance in that it attracted 
young people.  The common people were attracted to the pioneer missionaries 
because of what they saw as the possibility of social advancement.  
The history of the plight of the Tonghaks also seems to bolster this early, 
positive image of traditional missionary work within Korea.  The Tonghak 
Rebellion had both religious and political significance.  In the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, the selling and buying of government positions was common 
and those who became ‘officials’ would usually ‘recoup’ their ‘losses’ through 
extortion.  Taxes and levies were increased to three or four times the legal rate.  
As Suh has concluded, “extravagance, licentiousness, and debauchery were the 
order of the day at the court [and] the suffering people could no longer remain 
silent” (Suh 1981, 172). 
In 1895, the Tonghaks, a group mostly comprised of poor peasants, rose 
in rebellion in the South.  In many ways, it represented the first indigenous, 
organized Minjung movement in Korea and, armed with the ideology of the 
‘humanity of heaven,’ the oppressed Minjung began to define themselves as 
subjects, rather than objects, of history and destiny (Kim 1981, 194). 
Indeed after the government put down the Tonghak Rebellion, the 
countryside was ripe for missionary penetration.  Missionaries went into the 
countryside and began to make significant and deeply felt contacts with the 
Minjung associated with the Tonghak movement.  Most importantly, the Minjung 
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began to accept Christianity as indispensable in fighting for their deepest 
aspirations – justice, equality, and human rights.  As Moon pointedly notes 
"Christianity became a politically oriented faith and a religion of hope and power 
for the oppressed and suffering Minjung" (Moon 1985, 13, 17).  Kim Chi-ha, a 
Minjung theologian, emphasized ‘the unification of God and revolution.’  For him, 
“Minjung theology is the unification of Tonghak and Christianity, the unification of 
renewal of the human spirit and the revolutionary change for justice in the social 
structure… and the coincidence of worldly food (bread) and heavenly food 
(freedom)” (Suh 1981, 179). 
However, the missionaries soon began to ignore aspirations for national 
liberation because, increasingly under the influence of dogmatic theology, they 
avoided critical reflection on traditional Korean society.  Especially important here 
is the possibility that the early missionaries avoided considering indigenization 
and contextualization as praxis ways of knowing (J. Kim 1996, 244). 
The increasing sponsorship of fundamental pedagogy under fundamental 
theology by Protestant missionaries gradually led to an emphasis on the 
salvation of the individual soul.  It also led to a ‘banking system’ of education, that 
restricted the word of God to dogmatic, hierarchically enforced systems of 
learning.  Certainly fundamental theology made a positive contribution to the 
apologetics of the church.  However, the positivistic theory of knowledge that 
underlies that theology gradually led the fundamentalist pedagogy that received 
its mandates from fundamental theology to fossilize Christian faith as a system of 
belief most adequately reproduced through indoctrination.5
August 29th, 1910 was a day of national humiliation for the Korean people.  
This was the day that Korea was formally annexed to Japan.  The Korean people 
lost their country's independence and became enslaved to Japanese military rule.  
                                                 
5  The charge of indoctrination probably comes up most frequently in the context of religious 
instruction (Thiessen 1993, 9). Indoctrination is usually associated with a certain kind of content. This 
content consists of necessary and sufficient criteria for determining whether a person is indoctrinated 
(Thiessen 1993, 59). Indoctrination is seen as being especially related to religious beliefs in some ways. In 
other words, indoctrination is found in religious communities and institutions (Thiessen 1993, 59). 
Fundamental pedagogy has the goal of ‘conformity,’ whereby educators strictly teach religious beliefs and 
doctrines, being less interested in nurturing Christian lives and ethics. 
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The Chosun Yi Dynasty (the last dynasty in Korea) formally ended and the right 
of government was transferred to the Japanese emperor.  Only with the end of 
World War II in 1945 was Korea finally liberated from Japanese rule. 
During the time of national crisis (1910-1945) in which Korea was 
colonized by Japan, the missionaries felt that the estrangement between the 
Koreans and the Japanese presaged a general uprising.  However, they 
understood the hopelessness of fighting against the Japanese imperial army, and 
foresaw the danger of making the young Korean churches a political agency. 
It can be argued that the missionaries – unwittingly or otherwise – were 
successful in depoliticizing Korean Christians through mass revival meetings.  
Although revival meetings nurtured ethical and moral transformations within 
individual lives and engendered significant fellowship among Christian 
communities, the Christian message was not geared to the social and national 
crisis of the Korean Minjung.  The church leaders in this period became “products 
of early twentieth century fundamentalism, and their only concerns became of the 
‘salvation of souls’” (Moon 1985, 16). 
The desire for national liberation on the part of Korean Christians was 
completely ignored, and “the missionaries’ tight control of the Korean Christian 
communities stifled the dynamism of the autonomous communities which could 
have responded better to the historical predicament” (Moon 1985, 15). 
Some events, such as those of March 1st, 1919, in which patriotism was 
promoted by missionaries, led to the perception of Christianity as a politically 
oriented faith and a religion of hope and power for the oppressed and suffering 
Minjung (J. Kim 1996, 111).  However, during what Choo calls the Depoliticization 
Period of the Church (1919-1932) missionaries ceased to be pioneers and to 
preach directly to the Minjung.  They became organizers or managers, directing 
and supervising the Korean Christians’ evangelistic enterprise.  The Korean 
church moved into a new political situation in the 1920’s.  In this situation, Korean 
Christianity was losing its identity, and forgetting its mission in Korean society.  
The Korean church did not share the sufferings of the farmers, who were the 
majority of the Korean population.  It stayed aloof from the anti-Japanese 
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movements of the students (Choo 1981, 74).  Indeed, collaboration with the 
Japanese authorities was often a perceived necessity for their missionary work. 
In the 1920s, many Koreans began to believe that Christian education no 
longer promoted an historical consciousness and an indigenous approach to 
Christian education within Korean society.  The Korean church began to be seen 
as promoting a ghettoized Sunday-centered religion.  A famous Korean novelist, 
Kwang-su Lee wrote in criticism that “the Korean church looks down on modern 
culture, and curses the drivers and the soldiers who are working on Sunday” 
(Choo 1981, 74). 
During the Period of the Babylonian Captivity (1932–1960), the Korean 
church became increasingly “enslaved to authority and lost its subjective 
consciousness with the trials it faced and the confusion which set in” (Choo 1981, 
75).  Under the influence of imported, fundamental theology, much of the Korean 
church became an exercising ground for those seeking ecclesiastical authority 
and did not resist the enforcement of worship at Japanese shrines. 
Soon after the thirty-six years of Japanese rule in Korea ended in 1945, 
the country was divided.  The United States controlled the most significant 
movements in the South and the Soviets did so similarly in the North.  In 
undivided Korea, prior to 1945, most of the Christians lived in North Korea (Moon 
1985, 25). 
Soon after the War, especially during Syng-man Lee’s regime, South 
Korea, aided by the United States, began to ‘rebuild’ the country.  United States’ 
aid and business investments, however, were under the exclusive control of the 
ruling elite.  The result was two hierarchical structures in the economic system – 
the Korean ruling powers subject to foreign control and the common people 
directly subject to domestic power groups (Suh 1981, 25-26; Kim 1981, 193). 
During the regime of Syng-man Lee, the president, his associates, civil 
servants, and the army became increasing free to exercise their power over 
everyone else.  As one scholar has noted, “the government was actually a 
restructuring of the rigid Japanese colonist system into a somewhat more flexible 
bureaucracy” (Moon 1985, 26). 
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Those in power, however, necessarily face another.  In the case of South 
Korea at that time, that other consisted of the many thousands of widows, 
orphans, unemployed and low-paid urban laborers, farmers, and refugees from 
the North.  Living at or near a starvation level, these people increasingly added 
numbers to the class of Minjung. 
As things ‘developed,’ those in positions of power became richer and the 
Minjung became poorer.  The corruption was openly displayed and the injustice 
perpetrated against the Minjung became understandably unbearable.  In time, 
the other – created and politicized by such acts of dominance – began to rebel 
against the ways of the Lee’s regime. 
 
The Revitalization of Minjung Theology 
 
On April 19th, 1960 students and several other Minjung marched in the 
streets of Seoul to show their dissatisfaction with the government.  What is 
important to emphasize here is that this revolt was an example of a Minjung 
movement, and it was inspired by the ideals of equality, justice, liberty, and 
democracy that were taught by Korean Christians (Suh 1981, 29). 
The student’s Revolution of April 19th, 1960, as an heir to the spirit of the 
March 1st Independence movement of 1919, opens what Choo calls the Period 
of Awakening (1960--present) in Korean Church history.  The Korean church was 
seen by many to have regained its mission.  Choo (1981, 76),6noting a number of 
church declarations after 1960, contends that all “show clearly that once again 
Korean Christianity has begun to see the mission of the church to be that of 
being a church for and of the Minjung.” 
After 1960, an indigenous theology and pedagogy, namely Minjung 
theology and pedagogy, gradually began to be developed in response to 
fundamental theology and pedagogy.  Many factors in Korean history and society 
interwove as the specific background to such a development. 
                                                 
6  Among the declarations noted by Choo (1981, 76) are: “The Declaration of Human Rights in 
Korea” by the Korean National Council of Churches (1974); “The Declaration of Conscience” by Bishop 
Daniel Tji (1974); “The Theological Statement of Korean Christians” signed by 66 leaders of churches and 
seminaries and “The Declaration for the Restoration of Democracy” signed by 12 church leaders (1976 ). 
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Although Minjung-inspired reevaluations have been present from the 
earliest days of Christianity in Korea, since at least the 1920s, the leaders of the 
Korean Protestant churches have been overwhelmingly fundamentalistic, 
ritualistic, and formalistic.  As Moon argues:  
 
In spite of significant contributions toward self-awareness and nationhood 
by the churches, the majority of the leaders have not been influenced by 
the contemporary trends of the world church… The fact that Christian 
leaders under fundamental theology are primarily oriented toward ‘the 
other world’ and ‘salvation of souls’ has discouraged any meaningful social 
involvement of the churches (Moon 1985, 39).  
 
Since the 1970s, however, reflection by scholars on the student uprisings 
in the 1960s has gradually developed into the need to propose a more 
indigenous theology for Korean society.  In the 1970s many scholars began to 
discuss the role of the Minjung in twentieth century Korean history.  Among other 
things, they explored the connections that could be seen between the place of 
the Minjung and indigenous, contextual, and political theology.  Ongoing debate 
began amongst Korean scholars about the role of the Korean church vis a vis 
problems of indigenization and contextualization.  It is no surprise that national 
identity versus Christian identity and Korean culture versus Christianity have 
been primary issues.
The social history of Minjung liberation movements (including the Tonghak 
Movement in 1895, the March 1st Independence Movement in 1919, and the April 
19th Student Revolt in 1960), the Minjung religious traditions, and the past and 
the present cultural expressions of the Minjung are all being studied (Suh 1983, 
41).  For many Christian scholars and educators, it has become necessary to 
formulate a Biblical theology of the Minjung – for those who have been subjected 
to the inhumanity of oppression and contempt.
There are good reasons to call such a theology an indigenous, ‘grass-
roots’ theology.  It grew, and continues to grow, directly out of Christian 
experience in the political struggle for justice.  Beginning with the suffering and 
resistance of the Korean Minjung, Minjung theology is in many ways Korean 
theology.  In short, one can conclude with Moon that it is a theology of the 
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oppressed in the Korean political situation, a theological response to the 
oppressors who share in the struggle for liberation (Moon 1985, 53). 
The goal of Minjung pedagogy is a liberation wherein the struggle for 
human rights is united with the revolutionary demand for justice in social 
structures.  In order to establish a free and equal society, the Minjung must effect 
a drastic, systematic change in the existing order.  It is believed that with the help 
of insights derived from the Old Testament, they will be able to assume such a 
new responsibility.  In the past, such insights have strengthened their awareness 
of their bondage and offered them hope for liberation.  Indeed, an emphasis on 
Exodus appears in a Sunday School lesson book published in Seoul in 1907 
(Moon 1985, 16-17). 
In fact, Minjung theologians are interested in comparative studies of the 
Minjung’s condition and the socio-economic-political background of the Old and 
the New Testaments.  As Suh contends, 
 
[o]f particular interest in the area of the Old Testament are the Hebrews… 
the reign of Solomon, and the prophetic traditions. As for the area of 
theology, special attention is being given to studies on theodicy, Exodus, 
apocalyptic, the suffering servant, and the messianic spirit (Holy Spirit).  
The essential concern of the Minjung theologians using these two 
reference points is to interweave the Korean Minjung’s story and the Old 
Testament story (Suh 1981, 158). 
 
However, given that the interest is in the experiences of the Korean 
Minjung, the following dilemma proposed by Suh demands reflection: 
 
if it is viewed as an imported theology from Latin America, one can easily 
dismiss Minjung theology as a Korean version of a Latin American 
revolutionary theology inspired by Marxist ideology… On the other hand, if 
it is seen as an imported product of Western theological writings, then it 
would be a theology understood only by those who can read Western 
theology in foreign languages (Suh 1981, 18-19). 
 
I propose that Minjung theology could better deliver its objective by 
appreciating Minjung pedagogy.  Minjung pedagogy in Korea, however, has 
strongly depended on Paulo Freire, the great ‘advocator’ of pedagogy of the 
oppressed, whose work – stemming from Latin American situations – has not 
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been sufficiently contextualized as it has been appropriated into Korean cultural, 
social, and political dynamics. 
Further discussion of Minjung pedagogy requires that the difference 
between the notion of ‘the Minjung’ and ‘the Marxist proletariat’ be clarified.  Two 
quotes, one from Kim and one from Suh are, I believe, most instructive in 
bringing about a proper clarification. 
 
The identity and reality of the Minjung is known not by a philosophical or 
scientific definition of their essence or nature, but rather through their own 
stories - their social biographies which the Minjung themselves create and 
therefore can tell best. The proletariat is defined socio-economically, while 
the Minjung is known politically… the Minjung as historical subject 
transcends the socio-economic determination of history – a ‘beyond’ 
history which is often expressed in religious form (Kim 1981, 186). 
 
[And] 
 
While the proletariat of Marx’s theory is rigidly defined in socio-economic 
terms in all political circumstances, the notion of Minjung provides a 
framework of theology which takes into consideration the socio-economic, 
cultural, messianic praxis and political history of Korea and the socio-
political biography of the Christian koinonia in Korea (Suh 1981, 19). 
 
In my opinion, educators should attempt to formulate an indigenous 
pedagogy for the future that emerges out of reflections on the experiences of 
Koreans at this particular time in history and attempts to relate the gospel to the 
Korean context. With this goal in mind, Minjung theology seems to be too 
representative of Western thought, to pre-judging of Korean contingencies.  
Overly influenced by the same dualities of Western thought that have influenced 
fundamental pedagogy, Minjung pedagogy focuses on ‘empirical moments’ and 
‘dual moments’ such as ‘good/evil,’ ‘economic hierarchies,’ ‘the oppressor/the 
oppressed,’ ‘nationalism/de-Westernization.’  It’s the oppressor/the oppressed 
dichotomies are deployed in philosophically dualistic and non-contextual fashion. 
If Christian education in Korea has been for too long influenced, on the 
one hand, by a fundamental theology as a theoretical way of knowing, and, on 
the other hand, by a political movement as a praxis way of knowing, it is 
imperative that an investigation into the dualities that lend credence to such 
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positions be conducted.  The following chapters in this thesis consider a number 
of ways of questioning those dualities from a variety of hermeneutical, 
deconstructivist, and postmodern positions. 
This theoretical venture is not an escape from Korean contingencies.  As 
we will inevitably see, there is good reason to give greater reflection to the 
reasons behind the postmodern rejection of universal rationality and 
metanarratives in favor of particular stories, and be willing to pay closer attention 
to the stories of all those individuals on the margins.  We must heed, for example, 
the stories of Han so prevalent in Korean society, stories which have drawn the 
attention of several well-intentioned Minjung theologians. 
Han is an underlying feeling of Korean people.  On the one hand, it is a 
feeling of defeat, resignation and nothingness.  On the other hand, it is that 
tenacity of will for life which comes to beings who have been weakened by the 
situations in which they must live (Suh 1981, 54).  The sources and nature of 
such stories are very diverse and they allow access to the spirit of many people 
and their struggles.7 In this thesis, for example, I will specifically address the 
issue of the generation gap in Korean society, keeping in mind that youth in 
Korea have their own particular Han, a Han that must be heard if understanding 
among all people is to be enhanced in the future. 
Listening to the Han of different Koreans does not necessarily mean 
formulating syncretistic philosophies.8 Christian religious educators do not have 
to force the Gospels into a fit with what are very often markedly incompatible 
Shamanistic beliefs (J. Kim 1996, 268).  Syncretism is not the only strategy of de-
Westernization and a respect for others and an acceptance of pluralism does not 
mean the surrendering of what we hold dear through the fusion of it with that 
                                                 
7  Suh notes four major sources for the feeling of ‘Han’ amongst Koreans: “1) Koreans have 
suffered numerous invasions by surrounding powerful nations so that the very existence of the Korean 
nation has come to be understood as ‘Han.’ 2) Koreans have continually suffered the tyranny of the rulers 
so that they think of their existence as ‘baecksung’ (common people). 3) Also, under Confucianism’s strict 
imposition of laws and customs discriminating against women, the existence of women was ‘Han’ itself. 4) 
At a certain point in Korean history, about half of the population was registered as hereditary slaves, and 
many people were treated as property rather than as people of the nation. These people thought of their 
lives as ‘Han’” (Suh 1981, 54). 
8  One thinks here, for example, of Sung-bum Yun’s use of sincerity in his syncretistic theology. 
He attempted to synthesize native Korean culture and Biblical Christianity (Yun 1972). 
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which is foreign to us.  Neither, of course, does the celebration of such plurality 
intensify the drift and fragmentation of Korean Christian life.  Christian education 
needs a new philosophical perspective for its pedagogy and for nurturing the 
kinds of work on the part of Christian religious educators that brings people 
together. 
 In my opinion, such a new perspective will inevitably help people see 
common futures while helping them appreciate that their understanding of the 
world, their chances for making it a better place in which to live, and their 
relationships with others are inextricably intertwined.  The hermeneutical line that 
runs throughout this paper increasingly encourages a praxis mode of being and a 
Christian religious education in Korea for the future that engages the full 
spectrum of Korean contingencies. 
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II.  ‘CHRISTIAN EDUCATION’ VERSUS ‘CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS 
  EDUCATION’ 
 
While fundamental pedagogy has used fundamental theology as a 
discipline provoked by scientific thought and philosophical positivism for the 
application of its pedagogy, Minjung pedagogy under Minjung theology 
encourages an ‘empirical mood’ of ‘dual moments’ such as that of ‘scientific/non-
scientific era,’ ‘the oppressor/the oppressed (subject),’ and ‘propositional 
belief/living faith.’  Given this, two major questions present themselves. 
First, because the two dominant theologies (fundamental and Minjung) in 
Korea have functioned in an atmosphere of dualism, positivism, and objectivism, 
we must ask what contemporary matters such as postmodernism, pluralism, and 
relativism mean for Christianity in general and for the philosophy of Christian 
education in particular.  Secondly, we must ask if there is any philosophy to be 
viewed both as a new direction and as an appropriate response to the current 
situation. 
Before we begin to answer such questions, however, I believe it is 
important to distinguish the term Christian education from Christian religious 
education.  Many writers appear to treat them as synonymous terms, but I prefer 
‘Christian Religious Education’ for reasons that will become clear. 
Lois Lebar claims “Christian education is fundamentally an imitation of the 
methods of the ‘Master Teacher’” (Lines 1987, 214).  She draws a sharp contrast 
between secular and Christian education.  For Lebar, the proper approach for 
Christian education is a return to basics laid out in the authoritative word since 
“the answers to all our problems, or at least the principles, are to be found in 
God’s written Revelation of Himself rather than in any human source” (Lines 
1987, 215).  In Lebar’s approach, answers to the problems of human limitation 
are to be founded in the past. 
Certainly, the term ‘Christian education’ has a strong association in Korea 
with Protestant missionary work and teaching in Sunday schools.  Christian 
education there has focused on the reality of human brokenness (the doctrine of 
sin) and has sought to discover how a theology of revelation and salvation could 
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be ‘taught” through the church.  The top-down transfer of systematic doctrine was 
considered to be the answer.  Such ‘Christian education,’ however, continues to 
carry overtones of American imperialism and colonial dominance of religious 
practices. 
Indeed, it was not until 1960 that books began to critically examine the 
very notion of ‘Christian education.’  In fact, the first ‘Christian Education 
Association of Korea’ meeting was held in 1961. 
Thomas Groome argues that “when religious education is done by and 
from within a Christian community, the most descriptive term to name it is 
Christian religious education” (Lines 1987, 215).  Catechesis, religious instruction, 
and other current educational terms are deployed by Groome within such an 
adage. 
Martin Taylor continues to use both the terms “Christian education” and 
“religious education.”  For Taylor, the use of “religious education” should not be 
attributed to theology but to custom.  His point seems to be that it is the least 
particularistic term for the field (Lines 1987, 215). 
Educators working in the Netherlands touch upon issues that help to 
highlight why I believe the term ‘Christian education’ should be replaced with that 
of ‘Christian religious education.’  It is necessary to quote the words of Siebren 
Miedema and Willem L. Wardekker at some length. 
 
Commonly, plurality is thought of in terms of multiplicity of cultures: the fact 
that multiple cultures now come together in the same physical areas. This 
makes it necessary to develop adequate ways of interacting with persons 
belonging to another culture. But it also calls into question the basic tenets 
of our own culture, which may make for feelings of uncertainty and for 
relativism. The implications of this multiplicity for religious education are 
twofold… On the one hand, when we see that ‘our’ religion is one among 
many, it becomes difficult to defend the socialisation into just one (our 
own) religion, and a fortiori the right of existence of mono-religious schools 
is questioned. On the other hand, however, the multiplicity of religions is 
seen by many as a prime area where intercultural skill and attitudes like 
‘respect for others’ may be taught. Thus, teaching understanding and 
respect for the beliefs of others becomes a prime aim of religious 
education (Miedema and Wardekker 2001, 2). 
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Extrapolating from Wardekker and Miedema’s suggestions about the 
importance of the role of respect in our understanding of the term ‘religious,’ I 
argue for a ‘Christian religious education’ that encourages the extension of a 
person’s responsibilities towards others, which itself is an example of the 
deepening of a person’s Christian beliefs in an increasingly inclusive and unified 
experiential field.  Christian religious education should be an offering designed to 
be helpful in the resolution of all conflicts, including intergenerational ones, 
experienced in a fragmented and confused field of experience. 
In this thesis, Christian religious education is considered to be a practical 
activity attending to the Christian faith community and sponsoring the possibility 
of on-going interpretation, communication, and understanding.  Rather than being 
about the learning of the doctrines of Christianity, it is an education of the 
religious in life, of the unexpected, the unplanned, the unforeseen, and the 
unforeseeable.  It is an education about, and constitutive of, the blending of our 
internal selves and our movements through the world.  It is about the 
interconnectiveness of our being, knowing, and doing. 
I believe that the critical and supplementary readings that I offer in the 
following chapters of certain hermeneutical and deconstructivist perspectives can 
help Christian religious educators appreciate that the virtues of care and 
sensitivity so dear to them need not be bracketed when discussion turns to 
issues of an epistemological or ontological nature.  In fact, I believe that there are 
many resources within the contemporary philosophical community to defend the 
idea that ethical virtues are enhancing of our understanding of the world. 
 29
III.  THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
 
My main contention is that Christian religious education in Korea has been 
hampered by a false dualism; namely, that between fundamental theology’s construal of 
understanding as successful theory and Minjung’s construal of proper understanding as 
successful political praxis.  In the following chapters, I will present the arguments of 
selected thinkers in an attempt to show how that dualism, and the philosophical 
oppositions assumed by both fundamental and Minjung theology, may be overcome. 
It is my belief that the overcoming of such oppositions will increasingly enable 
Christian religious educators to better engage the world around them.  It will better 
enable them in helping members of their congregations achieve those valuable 
relationships that enhance the life of all.  My emphasis throughout this thesis on how 
Christian religious educators might help to resolve intergenerational strife is an attempt 
to depict one example of the greater attention to valuable relationships that follows in the 
wake of the rejection of philosophical dualisms. 
While fundamental theology and pedagogy took the object and task of 
philosophy as the development of ‘dogmatic’ statements, Minjung pedagogy 
began with analyses of the social reality within a particular socio-political situation, 
and then regarded the task of educational philosophy as ‘faith seeking intelligent 
action,’ a form of empirical praxis.  A tendency towards exclusive concentration 
upon either the salvation of one’s own soul or the facts of oppression has 
respectively marked the history of fundamental and Minjung pedagogy in Korea. 
There is, of course, no denying that present times are still in part under the 
shadow of Enlightenment-style attempts both to uncover ‘the’ way of knowing and 
to offer a ‘mirror’ of ‘objective reality’ using that way.  Nevertheless, the efforts by 
varyingly styled postmodernists, pluralists, and relativists to substantiate different 
ways of knowing can hardly be ignored.  Such efforts have precipitated a 
renewed interest in socio-culturally marginal, institutionally non-hegemonic, and 
conceptually challenging ways of knowing that highlight the importance of the 
contingent and the particular. 
 It can be argued that at the very core of all such contemporary thought is a 
rejection of the notion of universal or scientific reason (Bolt 1993, 56).  Observing 
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science being ‘put in its place’ in this way may initially enthuse many individuals 
living a life of faith.  It must be noted, however, that attacks on the notion of the 
universal have compelled even Christian believers to accept that the Christian 
religion is increasingly a religion among others in the West, no longer as 
privileged nor as the centre.  Christian religious education has to now examine 
the possibility of Christian faith as ‘a’ way of knowing or understanding (Bolt 1993, 
93).  It is because of this situation that many scholars have argued that even 
though fundamental and Minjung pedagogy need to be balanced and criticized 
using the insights of Postmodern philosophy, Christian religious educators should 
also criticize the situation of postmodernism, relativism and paganism (Han 1988, 
490; 492).  Christian religious educators must decide how to overcome the 
either/or of this apparent dilemma while nurturing respect for, and learning from, 
others. 
Christian religious education has much to offer in times marked by 
increasingly inter-disciplinary study.  It is far from moribund.  Indeed, it can be 
conceptualized and, more significantly, lived as more important today than ever 
before.  However, Issues of an allegedly philosophical (as opposed to 
‘educational’ or ‘theological’) nature cannot be ignored.  Such issues include 
questions about the role of reason or rationality in the growth of knowledge, the 
meaning of ‘understanding’ and ‘practice,’ and the development of a concept of 
faith that, allowing for the notion of tradition as a way of understanding, is actively 
tied to the seeking of new traditions. 
The relationship between theology and education is somewhat mystifying 
to representatives of both fields, but much of what is going on in theology relates 
to education and the broader notion of enculturation.  However, a divorce has 
taken place between theology and education (Han 1988, 465-466).  As Suh 
contends, fundamental pedagogy under systematic theology, “has attempted to 
‘depoliticize’ the Christian message and Christian activities” (Suh 1981, 22).  The 
curriculum of fundamental pedagogy was designed to be a search for purely 
religious experience and offered a banking system of education both in churches 
and Christian schools without considering the contextualities of Korea. 
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Chi-ha Kim, a Minjung theologian, claims: 
 
Minjung theology is the unification of Tonghak and Christianity, the 
unification of renewal of the human spirit and the revolutionary change for 
justice in the social structure, the unification of idea and practice, the 
unification of personal prayer and the corporate Mass, and the 
coincidence of worldly and heavenly food (freedom) (Suh 1981, 179). 
 
Nevertheless, even though Minjung theology represents an attempt as an 
indigenous theology to relate the gospel to the Korean context, Minjung 
pedagogy is totally biased towards western thought, such as that of Paulo Freire 
and Karl Marx. 
This has been the situation in most churches in Asia.  Christian education 
has had either a marginal status within theological curriculum, or a separate 
existence.  To be engaged in theology, it is assumed, is not quite the same as 
being engaged in education.  Theology and Christian religious education, 
however, should be informed by each other as equal partners in a conversation 
(Miller 1995, 257). 
The relationship between theology and education should be organic and 
this is possible only when theology and Christian religious education are both 
viewed as dynamic and critical, not static, processes.  That viewing has not been 
possible, however, because Christian religious education has been dominated by 
both fundamental and Minjung theology. 
It is very important to emphasize again that (Christian) educational 
philosophy is not distinct from philosophy in general.  It cannot offer a non-
contextual epistemic methodology.  Its offerings should be seen as an epistemic 
that is constantly being informed by and through its encounters with all that is. 
As they were in the seventeenth century, contemporary epistemology, 
metaphysics and ontology are inextricably entangled in discussions of science 
and the possibility and limitations of the human sciences.  To the Enlightenment 
philosopher, one of the reasons for taking up these matters was to examine the 
possibility of extending the scope of scientific knowledge and investigative 
procedures into many areas of human life (Anderson 1986, 14).  It was thought 
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that if it were possible to obtain scientific or ‘objective’ knowledge of human life, 
then it might be possible to establish social and political laws and conventions 
which would allow for the creation of a well-regulated and harmonious society. 
Today, few working within the human and social sciences share this 
aspiration; fewer still hold it with the same naivety.  Nevertheless, on the one 
hand, the possibility of a scientific understanding of human life remains an 
important topic of debate and dissension and, on the other hand, the 
transformation to a post-objectivist philosophy has generated new philosophical 
issues that mark ‘hermeneutical’ or ‘epistemological ontology’ off from traditional 
ontology and epistemology. 
Metaphysics or traditional ontology has commonly been construed as the 
branch of philosophical issues that deals with the nature of reality.  The branch of 
philosophical issues associated with the nature, sources and validity of 
knowledge has traditionally been construed as epistemology.  It is here that it is 
especially important to take note of Heidegger’s ontology, which precludes all the 
myriad distinctions between fact and value that continue to drive disciplinary 
schisms between ontology and epistemology. 
In the work of Heidegger with which I am concerned an unvalued fact and 
a pure value are both abstractions (Anderson 1986, 13).  Heidegger's successes 
in carrying out such an inquiry are a critical turning point for re-thinking ontology.  
They are also critical in the reformulation of the projects of hermeneutics as 
exhibited in the work of Gadamer, Habermas, Derrida, and Caputo. 
In this thesis, I use the term ‘ontology’ not primarily in its traditional 
meaning as ‘the science of all being’ but more in the Heideggerian sense of the 
Being of ourselves, as we exist in an agential relationship with historical reality. 
This sense is given greater cogency as we move in our investigation from 
Gadamer to Caputo. 
We will come to see that an ‘ontological turn’ in Christian religious 
education would encourage educators to engage and inform, and form and 
transform, the very Being of people in the world.  ‘Epistemic ontology’ is perhaps 
the best term to describe this investigation into the philosophy of Christian 
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religious education.  It better describes my central conviction that epistemology 
and ontology, ‘knowing’ and ‘being,’ should be united in the work of Christian 
religious educators. 
Christian religious education should attend to, engage, and shape one’s 
whole way of Being.  In this sense, it is at once a profoundly and thoroughgoing 
ontological activity with an integral practical component.  Educators who take to 
such a way of thinking will be inspired by the thought that the knowledge that is 
generated in their varied encounters in the world is a knowledge that will bring 
about changes in the lives – the Being – of people.  Such an inspiring motivation 
should remain in place even when such educators are engaged in what they 
have determined to be an exclusively epistemological undertaking (Groome 1991, 
8-11). 
Christian religious educators who take this turn will come to realize that 
exploring how the concept of understanding differs from that of practical 
knowledge involves an exploration of how doxastic relationships differ from 
valuable interpersonal relationships.  They will also realize that the latter 
exploration can only be contextually answered in the midst of their ongoing 
interactions with others in the world. 
In the following thesis, I will try to depict the increasing interdisciplinary 
nature of the philosophy of Christian religious education, and argue that, in 
dialogue with other disciplines, it cannot avoid directing its attention and 
contributions to specific issues relating to the substantive content of its practices.  
Indeed, it is my belief that engaging its interdisciplinariness actually brings 
Christian religious educators to not only consider the notion of valuable 
relationships, but to attempt to help people realize those kinds of relationships 
with others. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
GADAMER’S DIALOGUE MODEL OF 
HERMENEUTICAL UNDERSTANDING: 
TOWARDS A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF RELATIONSHIP 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is my contention that Gadamer’s ideas of education as enculturation 
(Bildung) can provide a sense of how better to enhance communication and 
understanding between generations, leading to more constructive relationships 
for all involved in any encounter.  Gadamer’s pedagogical goal is an enculturation 
wherein people develop a self-understanding and are able to educate themselves 
through their tradition.  Such enculturation involves a willingness to risk oneself 
through ‘an openness to the unexpected’ (Cleary & Hogan 2001, 525).  In coming 
to terms with the generation gap, I also propose that we seriously consider 
Gadamer’s related ideas of understanding and practical knowledge (phronesis). 
Gadamer’s ideas on education and enculturation are very closely related 
to his ideas on hermeneutical understanding and experience.  In his view, 
understanding is historical.  In Gadamer’s view, “the meaning of hermeneutical 
understanding cannot transcend its historical situation and the knowledge which 
it attains is always partial and revisable” (Warnke 1987, 40-41).  From this 
perspective, Bildung is a never-ending process of openness and a perpetual 
fusion of horizons, arising through dialogue, in which the idea is to learn 
continually (Blacker 1994, 215).  In other words, Bildung is an understanding 
marked by a facility for the endless disclosure of particular facets of a subject 
matter in a given language and culture.  Christian religious educators have to 
recognize that understanding is always partial and revisable, just as the ‘fusion of 
the horizon’ of the text and the horizon of the interpreters (Gadamer 1998, 308) is 
always an incomplete undertaking. 
Also important for Gadamer’s notion of understanding is his construal of 
the relationship between practical knowledge and virtue.  For Gadamer, practical 
knowledge is that of Phronesis, of acting in solidarity.  Phronesis is seen as a 
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virtue that empowers the human being to develop in a continual transformation 
that preserves the rationality of the form of social life that already exists. 
The first two sections of this chapter deal respectively with Gadamer’s 
ideas of hermeneutical understanding and hermeneutical experience.  The third 
and fourth sections deal with notions of Bildung and phronesis. 
In the final section of this chapter, I will suggest what Christian religious 
educators can learn from Gadamer’s ideas on enculturation.  As Christian 
religious educators working towards resolving problems between and within 
generations, we have to be constantly attuned to the fact that changes in our 
understanding of ourselves and our pedagogical goals and changes in our 
actions are intricately connected. 
Such a perspective allows us to see that the projections of all generations 
-- including their refusals, their denials and their resistances -- do not come out of 
a void.  They are at once fueled and shaped by the social, historical, and even 
linguistic contingencies in which they find themselves.  Such contingencies 
include the projections of previous generations. 
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I.  GADAMER’S CONCEPT OF UNDERSTANDING 
 
Aristotle and Plato’s Contribution to Gadamer’s 
Concept of Understanding 
 
An examination of Gadamer’s notion of Bildung (or  ‘enculturation’), must 
be prefaced by a depiction of the idea of ‘the good’ in Plato and Aristotle because 
this theme, which is Germane to my concerns about generation gaps, has had a 
large influence on Gadamer’s hermeneutical understanding. 
As we will see in greater depth in later sections, Gadamer’s reading of The 
Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy9allows for significant 
reflection on ‘the good’ and the relationship between theory and practice in a life 
of enculturation.  
Plato describes ‘the good’ as common to all things that are good.  Aristotle, 
however, contends that the good life is not “something common to all cases” 
(Gadamer 1986, 146).  It is not a universal principle of being (Gadamer 1991, 18).  
Moreover, although Aristotle agrees with Plato that the good life bears witness to 
a coming together of theoria and praxis, he believes that the determination of 
what is good or the right thing to do is achieved by a practical reasonableness 
(phronesis) (Gadamer 1986, 166).  It does not result from the application of a rule.  
Both the determination of the good and the good vary from case to case. 
As a contemporary exponent of Aristotle’s thought, MacIntyre, especially in 
his work on education, tries to direct attention to the goods served by each 
particular type of activity: 
 
A good education is one in which students learn not only how to 
play their intended part in different kinds of complex activities by 
developing their skills, but also one in which they learn how to 
recognize the goods served by those activities, goods which give  
purpose to what they do (MacIntyre and Dunne 2002, 2). 
 
This important type of understanding is practical rather than theoretical  
                                                 
9  See Hans-Georg Gadamer.  The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. P. 
Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). 
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and to acquire it is to see each individual human life as an answer to the 
question: ‘What is the ultimate human good?’  As we will see in greater depth in 
later sections, Gadamer’s reading of The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian 
philosophy10allows for significant reflection on ‘the good’ and the relationship 
between theory and practice in a life of enculturation. 
Gadamer is convincing in his argument that there is no definite division 
between a dogmatic methodological Plato and a flexible or practical Aristotle.  He 
claims that in spite of offering different occasions for the realization of the good, 
both Plato and Aristotle are elaborating a common ground of moral philosophy by 
differentiating theory, practice (techne/technical knowledge), and praxis (practical 
knowledge/moral philosophy) (Gadamer 1986, 34-35; 61). 
Gadamer stresses his belief that both Plato and Aristotle are practitioners 
of ‘logos’11philosophy (Smith 1986, xiv).  They agree about the relationship 
between theoria and praxis, claiming that the most laudable life is the life of pure 
theoria (Smith 1986, xxviii).  However, the notion of theoria in both Plato and 
Aristotle must be distinguished from ‘theory’ in modern philosophy of science.  
For Gadamer, the best life for both is philosophia, not Sophia and the life of 
theoria, is “striving for wisdom, not wisdom itself” (Smith 1986, xxviii). 
Phronesis (practical or moral knowledge) for Aristotle involves the 
successful recognition of the good in particular situations.  However, Gadamer 
emphasizes that practical knowledge also involves ‘applying’ the particular 
situation to the universal to articulate what the demands of the universal are in  
                                                 
10  See Hans-Georg Gadamer.  The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. P. 
Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). 
11  In pre-Socratic Greek philosophy, “logos as a first principle of knowledge, in the context of our 
assertion that knowledge is a way of coping with our world, highlights the relational component of 
knowledge, as coping with one’s world is the paradigm case of being in relation”(Friesen 2000, 74). While 
Plato uses logos in many different ways which encompass a wide diversity of nuances of the word, 
Aristotle regards logos mainly as reason, as an intellectual activity, or as speech (Friesen 2000, 77, 79). 
“Gadamer’s notion of logos is a significant departure from traditional ideas of logos (Plato to Aristotle) 
which holds that it is only possible in proportion to the accuracy with which a finite understanding logos 
reflects the infinite logos” (Friesen 2000, 81). In other words, it is impossible to understand Gadamer’s use 
of logos without considering the role of language in his thought in terms of the interrelation of logos and 
language. In connection to the notion of ‘logos,’ Gadamer’s use of logos is different from logocentrism, 
theory, or pure reason in the sense of the way to know the word and the specious ideal of objectivity in 
Western thought (Friesen 2000, 81). 
 38
the specific situation (Gadamer 1998, 322).  In short, in Gadamer’s work, 
understanding is modeled on phronesis and hermeneutics (i.e., the theory of 
understanding) is modeled on practical philosophy (Dunne 1997, 163). 
 
Hegel and Heidegger’s Contribution to Gadamer’s 
Concept of Understanding 
 
Gadamer's account of understanding is also developed with attention to 
Hegel’s notion of ‘historical experience.’ 
First of all, Gadamer bases his concept of understanding on Hegel’s 
‘historical experience’ of the spirit (Geist), or a ‘historical dialectic' which is 
distinguished from natural science (Palmer 1969, 195).  He develops the concept 
of ‘effective-history,’ in which we are already not only participating in historical 
experience but are also influenced by it. 
 Secondly, Gadamer’s concept of understanding is informed by Hegel’s 
dialectical negativity and the dynamic of the reflection of self-consciousness.  
Although Hegel emphasized “the dialectical movement of experience toward that 
which is the essential fulfillment of the spirit [Geist], in absolute knowledge” 
(Gadamer 1998, 355), Gadamer does not accept Hegel’s hypothesis of absolute 
knowledge nor his concept of absoluteness of Geist.  Gadamer argues that the 
experience of meaning does not culminate in absolute knowledge but rather in an 
openness to 'the experience of otherness' and 'the reflection of self-
consciousness' that is not completed in the dialectical process. 
Gadamer develops the meaning of Hegel’s historical experience and the 
concept of ‘effective history’ and takes this base for explaining his ‘historicity of 
understanding.’  But unlike Hegel’s dialectic, which tried to ground Geist in 
subjectivity with finality, Gadamer tries to relate Geist to the structure of 
understanding in Heidegger’s being-in-the-world.  The decisive turning point 
Gadamer makes in the history of hermeneutics is rooted in his use of 
Heidegger’s concept of understanding (Palmer 1969, 216). 
Heidegger, like Dilthey, took as his starting point the problem of how to 
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understand the structure of self-understanding, or Dasein12 itself.  But, unlike 
Dilthey, Heidegger does not look at the problem of the objectivity of 
understanding, but at the question of what understanding itself is.  Most 
importantly, he sees understanding as something which we cannot explain 
objectively, because in our very participation in understanding we are already 
under the limitation of its historicity (Palmer 1969, 130). 
Secondly, the concept of understanding in Heidegger is ‘the ability to 
grasp one’s own possibilities for being, within the context of the living world in 
which one exists.’  Moreover, “understanding always relates to the future; this is 
its projective character [Entwurfscharakter]” (Palmer 1969, 131).  But projection 
must have a base, and understanding is also related to one’s situation 
[Befindlichkeit] (Palmer 1969, 131).  In this sense, the primary conditions for 
understanding the world and history is 'situatedness' or ‘thrownness 
[Geworfenheit]’ and ‘projection [Entwurfenheit].’  Heidegger’s thrownness 
describes a way of Being as "the entity which has Being-in-the-world" (Heidegger 
1962, 174) in "Being-toward-possibilities" (Heidegger 1962, 188) and 'that-it-is' 
(Heidegger 1962, 174) in which Dasein exists and that Dasein is simply thrown 
into the world from the past.  On the other hand, projection is openness toward 
the future.  Dasein does not come to rest after it has been thrown.  Thrownness 
leads to projection.  Dasein has self-understanding in every moment in the world.  
This self-understanding participates in a tradition which Dasein does not create 
and contains a future beyond Dasein's control (Warnke 1987, 38).  In short, the 
self-understanding of Dasein is conditioned under temporality and thus our 
understanding of it has a certain character of “prestructure.”  As Heidegger claims, 
“all understanding of Dasein requires presuppositions” (Heidegger 1962, 151). 
 The prestructure of Heidegger’s understanding is not modeled on the 
traditional subject-object scheme; rather, it depends upon an already included  
                                                 
12  “Heidegger’s hermeneutics is not an interpretation of an interpretation but the primary act of 
interpretation which first brings a thing from concealment. Thus his hermeneutics is an interpretation of the 
being of Dasein and an analysis of the existentiality of Existenz, that is, hermeneutics is that fundamental 
announcing function through which Dasein makes known to himself the nature of being” (Palmer 1969, 
129-130). 
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subject-object.  Gadamer accepts this prestructuredness of understanding in 
Heidegger as a new turning point.  The Dasein thrown into the prestructuredness 
of understanding must so interpret itself in the temporal structure and must live its 
life in certain ways and determine some future and therewith the meaning of its 
past.  Therefore, the “self-understanding of Heidegger’s Dasein is thrown 
projection” (Warnke 1987, 38). 
 Gadamer develops his conception of ‘horizons’ from the prestructuredness 
of understanding and 'thrown projection' in Heidegger.  Gadamer insists that a 
human being has his/her own horizon and has commonness as part of that 
horizon (Warnke 1987, 39).  It is neither purely subjective, nor participation within 
a horizon of objectivity.  A horizon already includes subject and object.  The 
fusion of horizons is the integration of our historically determined concerns with 
the object of understanding.  In equating successful hermeneutic understanding 
with dialogical consensus, Gadamer means fusings between past and present or 
between the alien and familiar (Warnke. 1987, 103).  When horizons fuse, 
Gadamer says there is a real understanding and when one must interpret oneself 
in the process of understanding there is what Gadamer calls 'a practical 
understanding.'  In this sense, Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding is not 
about third-person knowledge of things.  It is an understanding of where one is 
and where one may be going. 
 
 41
II.  NEGATIVITY, OPENNESS, RELATIONALITY, AND 
     LINGUISTICALITY:  THE COMPONENTS OF HERMENEUTICAL 
EXPERIENCE IN THE WORK OF GADAMER 
 
In this section, I would like to outline how Gadamer’s notion of 
hermeneutical understanding relates to his notion of hermeneutical experience.  
For Gadamer, understanding is made through a tradition, 'the horizon' within 
which we do our thinking.  There are two horizons: the horizon of the interpreter 
and the horizon of tradition.  Gadamer claims that the 'fusion of horizons’ 
constitutes real understanding.  The fusion of horizons allows the meeting of the 
past with the present.  Gadamer insists that understanding is hermeneutical 
experience – not a method but the very way of human existence (Warnke 1987, 
41).  It is not perception but experience itself.  Hermeneutical experience has the 
characteristics of negativity, openness, relationship, and linguisticality. 
Whenever we listen or read, we automatically apply interpretive principles 
in trying to understand what is meant.  When a person is speaking in a different 
language, we are more aware of the interpretive efforts we must make to 
understand them.  If we are reading a difficult book, we may reread a section to 
understand the meaning clearly.  Hermeneutics involves the identification of the 
principles used to properly interpret someone else’s communication.  However, it 
is not something that we use only in the rarefied atmosphere of academia.  We 
are always using it at some level to understand others. 
 
Hermeneutical Experience as Negativity and Openness  
 
Gadamer insists that when we experience an object we do not understand 
better what is already partially understood, but that we understand differently 
(Palmer 1969, 233).  Gadamer defines this as the creative negativity in 
experience. 
 For Gadamer, experiential negativity has a productive meaning.  Such 
experience is not a completely new experience of any given object; in fact, we 
gain knowledge of the object as a result of it (Gadamer 1998, 353).  Creative 
negativity marks the movement from given perceptions and values to that which 
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is new and other (Gadamer 1998, 353).  One who is called experienced becomes 
such not only through experiences, but also through openness to new experience.  
The fulfillment of experience “is not in definitive knowledge, but in a diverse, and 
receptive openness to, experience that is made possible by experience itself” 
(Gadamer 1998, 355). 
In understanding the notions of negativity and openness in the work of 
Gadamer, the notions of ‘temporal distance,’ ‘effective history,’ and ‘fusion of 
horizon’ are important.  Firstly, the openness of conversation for Gadamer is 
marked by ‘temporal distance,’ that, contra positivistic portrayals of understanding, 
is not a negative thing, but rather a source of understanding.  The time between 
the production of a text and its varied re-interpretations is not a gap that swallows 
all possibility of understanding, but is rather a ‘supportive ground’ (Dunne 1997, 
118). 
Temporal distance provides the ‘otherness’ between interpreter and text 
that allows for productive communicative understanding.  The perspectives of the 
interpreter and of the text are not given prior to the attempts at communication 
themselves (Dunne 1997, 119). 
Secondly, we as interpreters are under ‘effective history.’  Although the aim 
of hermeneutical understanding is to increasingly open ourselves to the truth 
claims made by others, we as interpreters have already been formed by the past, 
including, in many cases, the influence of the text as itself part of an entrenched 
tradition. 
Conscious of it or not, we cannot avoid being influenced.  Effective-
historical consciousness is related to ‘prejudices,’ including those in depictions of 
generation gaps.  ‘Effective-historical consciousness’ is marked by the ability to 
discern a prejudice that has been lost in the mixing, by ‘naïve consciousness,’ of 
the past into the present (Dunne 1997, 121). 
By being alienated from that which is familiar, through opening ourselves 
to others, we can learn to recognize our prejudices.  Becoming aware of our 
prejudices involves becoming aware of who we have become (our ‘generation’) 
through opening ourselves to the being and becoming (‘the generation’) of others. 
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We cannot separate our naïve, ‘blind prejudices’ from knowledge-generating 
‘justified prejudices’ or communication enhancing ‘enabling prejudices’ by 
autonomous acts of pure reason or self-reflection.  However, through dialogical 
encounters with what is handed down to us, we can test and risk our prejudices 
(R. Bernstein 1986, 90).  For Gadamer, such a testing is an ongoing, open-ended 
undertaking (R. Bernstein 1986, 90).  Only in the hermeneutical circle of 
understanding do we learn to productively distinguish blind from enabling 
prejudices. 
Thirdly, Gadamer’s conception of openness includes the notion of horizon. 
By interactings with a text, our horizon is already being expanded beyond itself.  
No one possesses one’s present in a way that allows one to distinguish it sharply 
from the otherness of the past (or another’s present).  As Gadamer stresses, our 
present horizons owe much to the past (Dunn 1997, 121).  Understanding is 
always the fusion of past and present horizons, a fusion enabled by the 
openness of effective historical consciousness. 
 
Hermeneutical Experience as Relationality 
 
The negativity and openness of experience reflect the structure of ‘I-Thou.’  
Gadamer detects three modes of the hermeneutical experience in the relation of 
‘I-Thou.’ 
 One mode is the attitude that ‘Thou’ is not a person but a thing, a 
predictable being (Gadamer 1998, 358).  This attitude methodically excludes 
every subjectivity and understands ‘Thou’ to be a regularity to be taken account 
of in human behavior.  Such an idea may, for some commentators, offer parallels 
to Buber’s depiction of the ‘I-It’ relationship as a first step towards the 
consciousness of self provided by the ‘I-Eternal Thou’ relationship.13 As we will 
see, however, Gadamer’s ideas are marked by a greater sensitivity to how our 
effective histories and the actual situatedness of the other in communication 
                                                 
13  For interesting educational and theological elements in the work of Buber, see Sean Blenkinsop, 
“Martin Buber’s Education: Imitating God, the Developmental Relationalist” in Philosophy of Education 
Society: 2004 60th Annual Meeting Program, 26 March 2004. p. 3. 
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allows for unique trajectories of self-development. 
 A second mode of the hermeneutical experience is the attitude that the 
‘Thou’ deals with a person, but the ‘Thou’ is seen only through and from my point 
of view.  It is still very much “a form of self-relatedness” (Gadamer 1998, 359).  
This relationship claims self-understanding of the other.  In this 'I-Thou' relation, ‘I’ 
only anticipates the other and intercepts from the other (Gadamer 1998, 359).  
There is a reflection on the relationship to the other, but this reflection is not to 
participate and to reflect on 'I' and 'Thou' together. 
 A third type of hermeneutical experience is a relation in which the 
'Thou' is a living person and the claim of 'Thou' is heard and better understood as 
reflecting the experience of 'I'.  This type has the characteristics of question and 
answer dialogue (Gadamer 1998, 369).  The interpreter himself or herself may 
both hear the text speak and participate to revise his or her own perspective and 
relationship of openness.  Gadamer regards the most reasonable attitude as 
openness to historical consciousness as effected.  However, Gadamer's 
openness includes the question of the text as well as the hearing of the word of 
the text.  Understanding tradition requires that the “reconstructed question be set 
within the openness of its questionableness” (Gadamer 1998, 374).  The text is 
not fixed nor closed, but moving and changing within the horizon of the interpreter.  
In this transformation, the fusion of horizons happens and this happening is the 
relationship of openness. 
 Of these three types of relationships, Gadamer applies the third, dialogical 
type to hermeneutical experience.  This relationship of hermeneutical experience 
works within the context of language.  Gadamer insists that there is neither ‘I’ nor 
‘thou’ as isolated, substantial realities.  I may say ‘thou’ or I may refer to myself 
over against a ‘thou,’ but a common understanding precedes these situations 
(Wachterhauser 1986, 229). 
 
Hermeneutical Experience as Linguisticality 
 
Gadamer makes two general claims about language.  The first is that 
every conversation presupposes, even creates, a common language (Gadamer 
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1998, 378).  Hence, language is ‘the universal medium’ which can make possible 
the human experience of the world.  Humans possess the world through 
language.  To possess the world means to have a definitive attitude about the 
world, an attitude made possible through language.  For Gadamer, the 
hermeneutical problem is not about the mastery of language.  It is about 
acquiring an understanding of the subject matter within language (Gadamer 1998, 
385). 
This understanding of language can be used to examine the 
understanding of the meaning of a text.  To understand the meaning of a text 
does not only mean to reconstitute the linguistic custom in which the author is 
present but also to constitute a common language, to reach for an understanding 
about the ‘truth’ of the text. 
 Secondly, Gadamer rejects the idea that a universal object language, a 
concept positivism assumes, secures ‘objectivity.’  He insists that such an 
understanding of language separates actions and norms of action from the 
language games, the hermeneutic situation, that give them sense (Warnke 1987, 
109).  As Warnke succinctly argues, in Wittgensteinian fashion, one has to learn 
the new language of value and practice from the ground up by participation in the 
activities of a group (Warnke 1987, 110). 
 Gadamer insists that language does not mean a universal object language, 
like positivists claim, but rather a universal medium.  Because language itself is a 
universal medium, it is impossible to understand events or meaning as a 
universal experience – they must be understood in terms of the language game 
to which they belong (Warnke 1987, 109). 
 Therefore, the hermeneutical experience is about a negativity that is a 
willingness and readiness to give up my knowing framework about an openness 
that admits different understandings and about language as the relationships of a 
mutual dialogue that is the universal medium. 
Gadamer claims that the technicization of words in scientistic language 
should be overcome through an appreciation of hermeneutical understanding as 
negativity, openness, relationality, and the language of hermeneutical experience.  
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All understanding involves what Gadamer calls a ‘hermeneutical understanding’ 
between past, present, and future in which we are neither complete masters nor 
slaves, but participants in a movement of meaning reflective of the true power of 
words (Wachterhauser 1986, 233). 
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III.  GADAMER AND THE PEDAGOGICAL GOAL 
 OF ENCULTURATION 
 
It is my belief that Gadamer’s contribution to the notion of education as 
‘Bildung’ can contribute to accommodating both commonality and difference 
between generations. 
The input-output school system valorized in the Enlightenment lost sight of 
the end of education.  It became a teaching of ‘skills’ divorced from those 
contexts that should make learners be committed to humanity, community, and 
virtue.  However, one of the great achievements of the Enlightenment was to 
have recognized how public debate and understanding the diverse goods of a 
particular life are necessary for a rational politics.  Thus, the idea of 
Enlightenment seems like a contradiction.  Knowledge increasingly became 
reduced to the private acquisition and accumulation of factual givens, eclipsing 
collective inquiry into the common good, into that which enhances the life of all 
who partake in its sharing. 
Gadamer’s notion of ‘enculturation’ as a pedagogical goal helps us focus 
on truth vs. change; freethinking or space vs. restriction; dialogue vs. self-
education; old generation vs. new generation.  It is also the fulcrum for 
distinguishing human reason from Enlightenment reason. 
From the Greek point of view, paideia (Bildung) is neither private, nor 
about public utility.  Rather, human cultivation manifests itself within a harmonious 
balance of the individual and the general interest, allowing for a manageable 
curriculum to emerge into the Akyklios Paideia (Nordenbo 2002, 346).  The 
educational thinking of Renaissance humanism held that a proper education was 
a Bildung that involved study and individual development that was harmonized 
with the world and society (Nordenbo 2002, 346). 
Gadamer derives the notion of Bildung from Herder, in whose work 
humanity has to build itself against and through the past to realize itself 
(Gadamer 1998, 10).  Gadamer draws our attention to the theological content of 
the concept by noting that the word Bildung is evocative of that mystical tradition 
which stipulates that people are to cultivate themselves in the image of God that 
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is within them (Grondin 1997, 163).  For Gadamer, human sciences is consisted 
of what we have in the concept of formation (Bildung), education or culture 
(Grondin 2003, 24-25). 
Gadamer, of course, is opposed to the over-valorization of scientistic 
thinking in Enlightenment attacks on Renaissance humanism and is very 
interested in how the notion of Bildung undergoes a change from Kant to Herder.  
According to Gadamer, Kant uses the word ‘Bildung’ to mean ‘cultivating’ a 
capacity (or natural talent), an act of freedom by an acting subject related to the 
autonomous intellect of subjectivism. 
Influenced by the Kantian idea of duties to oneself, Hegel emphasizes 
Sichbilden (educating or cultivating oneself) and Bildung (Gadamer 1988, 10).  
Gadamer explains how Hegel distinguishes the nature of practical Bildung from 
Enlightenment reason as both a scientistic concept of objectivity and an 
individualistic subjectivism.  Hegel argues that the being of Geist (spirit) has an 
essential connection with the idea of Bildung (Gadamer 1998, 12). 
Hegel draws a distinction between practical Bildung and theoretical 
Bildung, which is reminiscent of Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical 
knowledge (episteme) and practical knowledge (phronesis).14 Theoretical Bildung 
consists in “sacrificing particularity” and rising “above the immediacy of its 
existence to universality” (Gadamer 1998, 12).  Practical Bildung is achieved  
                                                 
14  According to Gadamer, in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguished the 
deliberative faculties, phronesis and techne, from the scientific faculties, episteme and sophia (Gadamer 
1999, 152). This is not what we mean by knowing in the realm of science. “Episteme (theoretical 
knowledge) means scientific knowing which is much closer to what we now call rational knowing or 
knowing by reason”(Friesen 2000, 3). While “episteme is a mathematical knowing by means of necessary 
formulas according to the canons of logic, Sophia as an intuitive knowing goes beyond deliberation” 
(Friesen 2000, ix). What we currently think of as science corresponds more closely to what the Greeks 
called techne. Phronesis and techne are the other two ways of knowing which are linked because of their 
deliberative characteristics. Their concern focuses on the moral issues of life and about the right thing to do 
in a particular situation. The notions of phronesis and techne are regarded as deliberative faculties 
correlating universal and particulars in concrete ways that cannot be determined beforehand. Phronesis and 
techne are, nevertheless, distinguished in some fundamentally significant ways. Phronesis (practical 
knowledge or moral knowledge) involves a similar deliberation thought to techne. While “techne is 
normally thought of as technical skill which deliberates about the best way to achieve the desired ends of 
specific production,”(Friesen 2000, ix) phronesis is the knowledge that knows how to make the appropriate 
application by means of proper deliberation. And phronesis is not only concerned with how to do the right 
thing, but more specifically, what the right thing to do in any particular situation is (Gadamer 1998, 317). 
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when, in distinction from the immediacy of personal desires and needs and 
private interest, one recognizes “the basic character of the historical spirit; to 
reconcile itself with itself, to recognize oneself in other being” (Gadamer 1998, 
13). 
For Hegel, the basic idea of Bildung is to recognize one’s self in the 
foreign other and to feel at home in it (Gadamer 1998, 14).  Therefore, Hegel 
states that every individual is always engaged in the process of Bildung in as 
much as the world into which he is growing is one that is humanly constituted 
through language and custom.  In short, Bildung is not only about a process. It is 
that space within which educated people (Gebildete) live (Gadamer 1998, 14). 
Even though Gadamer criticizes both Kant’s notion of ‘cultivating a 
capacity’ by the autonomous acting subject and Hegel’s idea of ‘Bildung,’ he uses 
their insights into the nature of Bildung to deepen the meanings he gives to the 
notions of hermeneutical understanding and enculturation.  Gadamer further 
claims that, like Hegel, Dilthey accepts the possibility of transcending one’s 
historical situation to acquire an unconditioned knowledge of self and others.  
Dilthey does this while developing the idea of an historical consciousness against 
the Enlightenment’s idea of a-historical objectivistic consciousness (Shin 1994, 
70).  Dilthey believes that the unique quality of humanity is ‘understanding.’  
Palmer contrasts Dilthey’s notion of understanding with scientistic understanding. 
 
Explaining is for the sciences, but the approach to phenomena that unites 
the inner and outer is understanding. The sciences explain nature, the 
human studies understand expressions of life. Understanding can grasp 
the individual entity, but science must always see the individual as a 
means of arriving at the general, the type… The human studies must, 
Dilthey contends, attempt to formulate a methodology of understanding 
that will transcend the reductionist objectivity of the sciences and return to 
the fullness of ‘life’ of human experience (Palmer 1969, 105). 
 
The notion of the fullness of life is something that I wish to invoke at 
several places in offering of a new understanding of valued relationships.  
According to Dilthey, “we perceive, think, and understand in terms of the past, 
present, and future, in terms of our feelings and moral demands and imperatives” 
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(Palmer 1969, 103).  He is in agreement with Hegel that life is a ‘historical reality,’ 
but in disagreement with him that history is the movement of absolute spirit.  
Dilthey gives clarification to the idea that history expresses life as relative and 
varied.  To this extent, his ideas lend credence to the postmodern underwriting of 
history as flux. 
Nevertheless, one can find in the work of Dilthey the acceptance of the 
possibility of transcending the historical situation and finding pure objectivity.  In 
Gadamer’s view, Dilthey neglects his own insight into the historicity or temporality 
of experience and too readily accepts a Hegelian objective spirit in his attempt to 
underwrite both the possibility of shared individual experiences and the possibility 
of species-wide knowledge gained from those experiences (Warnke 1987, 32).  
Gadamer thus criticizes Dilthey’s historicity as being a continuation of a 
scientistic Enlightenment due to the experiences of an over-arching 
consciousness or subject (Warnke 1987, 30). 
Experience (Erlebnisse) for Dilthey is crucial in orientating a person’s self-
conception and life conduct.  In fact, Dilthey believes that historical knowledge 
and self-knowledge are both gained through experience and reflection upon that 
experience (Warnke 1987, 31).  As noted earlier, his notion of ‘educated people’ 
is born from his assumption of the possibility of common experiences and 
species-wide knowledge attainable from such experience (Warnke 1987, 31). 
As we will see in the next section, Gadamer’s notion of Bildung moves 
from a productive alienation to not only a self-education, but also to an 
engagement of the good.  Although Gadamer insists that Education (Erziehung) 
is about educating oneself and that ‘enculturation’ (Bildung) is self-cultivation 
(Gadamer 2001, 529), his ideas about education are about redefining and 
sustaining the practices of human learning. 
In writing of Bildung as ‘self-education,’ Gadamer directs our minds to 
those situations which arise between young generations and those whose 
responsibility it is to educate them.  Gadamer wonders who real educators are, 
and answers that one’s true educator is oneself.  For Gadamer, we should never 
forget that “‘we’ educate ourselves, that humanity educates itself, and that the so-
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called educator participates in this process only in such modest roles as teacher 
and as mother” (Gadamer 2001, 530).  He characterizes “Bildung as the properly 
human way of developing one’s natural talents and capacities” (Grondin 1994, 
163).  But Gadamer wishes to underline what he sees as the interactiveness of 
self-education.  Thus, he stresses the importance of the continual presence of 
others for our being-in-the world (Gadamer 2001, 534).  Gadamer draws from the 
humanistic tradition.  The characteristic of humanism, for Gadamer, is openness 
to the enlightening perspective of those who have preceded us and bequeathed 
to us the wealth of their experience and wisdom. 
Although education is, primarily self-education (Cleary and Hogan 2001, 
520), because the nurturing of self-education involves developing relationships 
with others, its exercise becomes a responsibility (Cleary and Hogan 2001, 520).  
This notion connects with how Gadamer applies the dialogical type of I-Thou 
relationship – as a relationship of reciprocal responsibility – to the growth of 
hermeneutical experience.  The idea of reciprocal responsibility is, of course, also 
very important in all reflection on the role of official educators.  Gadamer’s 
apparent attack on teachers is in fact only an attack on the over-valorization of 
the official role of teachers.  Christian religious educators who learn from 
Gadamer will come to appreciate that the self-understanding and communicative 
interactions of the teacher are very important elements in any pedagogical 
undertaking. 
As Gadamer argues in his book The Idea of the Good in Platonic-
Aristotelian Philosophy, because Plato and Aristotle considered the idea of the 
Good as above and beyond all, they considered it of most importance to 
distinguish knowledge of the good from knowledge of techne.  Gadamer does not 
want philosophy to be ashamed of its search for the Good precisely because he 
believes that the human mind and heart are drawn more deeply to the Good than 
to anything else (Nicholson 1997, 309). 
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IV.  GADAMER’S VIEWS ON PHRONESIS AND VIRTUE 
 
 Gadamer’s critique of reason consists in championing the emancipatory 
spirit of the Enlightenment against the Enlightenment objectivism of scientistic 
reason.  Gadamer tries to merge the power and being of tradition with 
Enlightenment ideals of reason, human rationality (Grondin 2003, 97).  For 
Gadamer, scientistic reason sacrifices individuality and results in the alienation of 
the public from individual identity, creativity, and a sense of responsibility and 
morality.  In contrast to scientistic reason, “the virtue of phronesis is a state of 
awareness and ability acquired in the course of life” (Teigas 1995, 83).  
Philosophical hermeneutics in its valorization of ‘self-reflection’ and expressive 
capabilities acquired in interpretive acts puts us on the path towards such 
practical wisdom. 
Gadamer’s concept of understanding is closely related to Aristotle's 
practical knowledge.  Gadamer’s attention is drawn to Aristotle’s distinction 
between phronesis and techne as deliberative faculties, and episteme and sophia 
as sceintific faculties (Gadamer 1998, 314-317). 
As deliberative knowing, phronesis and techne require an understanding 
of both particular and general situations (Gadamer 1986, 166; Gadamer 1998, 
317).  Gadamer believes that phronesis as a mode of practical philosophy is 
characterized by deliberation through tradition. 
For Gadamer, following Aristotle, this also the point at which the 
fundamental difference between nature and human civilization comes into stark 
relief.  Gadamer agrees with Aristotle that the well-developed moral 
consciousness itself (i.e., phronesis) is an ability to sensitively apprehend the 
good and duty (Dunne 1997, 159).  Concerned with the science of the good in 
human life, practical philosophy promotes that good itself (Dunne 1997, 160).  As 
philosophy, practical philosophy is an articulation of what Gadamer calls the 
‘universal desire to know,’ and it is practical because this desire “does not break 
off at the point where concrete practical discernment is the decisive issue” 
(Dunne 1997, 161).  Thus my claim that ‘enculturation’ as a pedagogical goal of 
Gadamer is based on the practical philosophy of phronesis. 
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Gadamer's practical concept is also akin to Aristotle's belief that human 
beings constitute self-identity in the community.  He argues that the scientization 
and materialization of civilization has distorted our human relationships and, 
thereby, Aristotle’s concept of solidarity.  By conceptualizing practice as the 
application of (scientific) theory, science gives preeminence to adaptive qualities, 
thereby posing “the greatest danger under which our civilization stands” 
(Gadamer 1998, 73).  Gadamer argues that our relationship to ethics has been 
destroyed, and then describes the hermeneutical task that we should pursue. 
 Gadamer stresses that one of the distinguishing characteristics of 
phronesis is that of deliberation through tradition.  As social beings, people are 
deeply influenced by the society within they live.  Our being and becoming is 
inextricably wedded to the being and becoming of society.  Gadamer insists that 
application is an indispensable part of understanding because it relates to 
specific situations in terms of what is “the right thing to do” – one’s decision on 
the basis of reasonable, practical deliberation (Gadamer 1986, 163). 
In the work of Gadamer, moral knowledge mirrors understanding in 
general; moreover, there is a special relationship between hermeneutical 
understanding and phronesis, (as the ethical knowledge or virtue) (Dunn 1997, 
156-157; 275).  In addition, phronesis as the practical wisdom is accompanied 
with an application of ethical knowledge that is not detached from the subject and 
from its concrete situation (Grondin 2003, 106).  Although phronesis as the 
science of the good in the concrete situation pursues a practical effect (Dunn 
1997, 160), phronesis as ethical knowledge is always concerned with “the 
knowledge of others, as opposed to oneself, ought to do” (Warnke 1987, 94).  
Furthermore, what is important does not merely concern application of a rule to a 
particular situation.  What is good in a particular situation is precisely the question 
that must be answered in the situation, and this very specific question cannot be 
answered apart from the situation” (Friesen 2000, 100-101).  The matter of ‘what 
is good’ refers to the question of “the-for-the-sake-of which is the good” 
(Gadamer 1986, 146). 
Gadamer unites the idea of the shaping of persons into seekers of wisdom 
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as a pedagogical practice in Plato with the idea of the deliberative skill of 
phronesis in Aristotle.  In this connection, in his hermeneutics, Gadamer takes up 
the notion of ‘the good’ as being engaged in practical knowledge.  Gadamer 
reshapes the notion of phronesis to reflect the inescapable historical nature 
‘being-in-the-world’ (Holub 1991, 57). 
Gadamer argues that the notion of understanding must be modeled on a 
phronesis that is directed towards engaging in the good.  Such a phronesis, 
however, cannot be provided by Enlightenment-cum-positivistic ideas of 
education that reify reason.  For Gadamer, the notion of phronesis is related to 
Bildung as ‘self-education.’  It is an emergent capability that we should gradually 
learn to embrace as an enduring responsibility. 
Phronesis at work in the reflective interplay of the general and the 
particular provides the means for reaching the state of practical wisdom on which 
hermeneutical understanding is modeled.  For Gadamer, “the Bildung of 
phronesis, being engaged in the good, suggests that even while dependent upon 
prejudice, we are drawing upon the process of introspection itself” (Friesen 2000, 
x).  This is one of the reasons why Gadamer speaks of phronesis as 
responsiveness rather than control.  At this point, we can see how phronesis is 
connected with the responsible use of reason in dialogical situations (Teigas 
1995, 166). 
Phronesis, as Bruns has succinctly argued, is different from a rationality of 
problem solving, which is why experience is always more important than 
principles, vocabularies, concepts, procedures, and rules (Bruns 1992, 259).  
Moreover, experience is something much different than the totality of positive 
knowledge.  To be experienced means to be open to experience, to recognize 
that there is always a ‘something more’ to knowledge and life, that there is 
always an innovation to tradition, a supplement to any given.  Such a view 
encourages an openness to those multifaceted and intersecting ‘minor’ narratives 
that define all alleged ‘others.’ 
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V.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GADAMER’S ‘DIALOGUE MODEL’ 
     AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
 
From the standpoint of fundamental or Minjung pedagogy, younger 
generations of Koreans are not viewed as subjects from which we can all learn.  
They are viewed as sub-cultural objects or ‘counter-cultures’ without ground.  
Because they have viewed youth as cultural objects that defy systematic reading, 
neither fundamental nor Minjung pedagogy has focused on Generation Xers as a 
generation shaped by different demands of concreteness than those that shaped 
the Builder and the Boomer generations.  It is my belief that Christian religious 
educators can learn much from Gadamer’s hermeneutics, which is not modeled 
on the metaphor of reading, but on the transactional metaphor of pedagogy in 
which the making and taking of meaning are on-going deliberative acts. 
With Gadamer’s reflections on the productive alienation of Bildung in mind, 
we can begin to see that the alienation between teachers and students in Korean 
society could be reduced if they were enabled to understand one another as 
interpreters and mediators empowered with the capacity to project beyond their 
own specific horizons, traditions and generations.  This interaction between 
generations is possible because there is a productive alienation from restrictions 
inherent in all traditions. 
All generations must learn to create a new solidarity and to participate in it 
with one another.  This new solidarity will necessarily learn from, while enhancing, 
both generation’s value systems and voice.  Self-development is intertwined with 
the encouraging of those around us. 
Christian religious educators must note that this holds equally true for 
parents and children, and that assessing the role of parents will be very important 
in offering solutions to those gaps in understanding – those temporal distances – 
that give definition to different generations.  Christian religious educators must 
recognize that members of all generations will view all that is from their own 
perspective and that their perception of the ‘good’ will be colored by a myriad of 
factors.  We must begin to accept that generalizing stories necessarily do 
violence to allegedly ‘marginal’ groups that do not neatly fit into the narrative 
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molds of older generations.  We must also accept that the postmodern belief that 
local narratives of marginal groups are necessarily at odds with the stories told by 
members of dominant groups is itself a meta-narrative. 
I contend that we should not think that we can give up meta-narratives or 
grand narrative while entertaining the mini-narratives, localized stories, or 
counter-narratives of which Lyotard speaks.15 While the old generations should 
listen to the voices of counter-narratives, Generation Xers’ allegedly 
incommensurable inquiries of faith, friendship or love, Generation Xers have to 
hear the old generations’ views as narratives without which their own 
transgressions and, thus projections, would not be. 
Korean Christian Generation Xers are skeptical of anyone who claims to 
be the sole keeper of truth, but they consider relationships to be very important. 
According to Gadamer, the emancipation from the family usually, if not always, 
means entering into a new solidarity by making friends (Gadamer 1992, 59).  The 
desire for genuine relationship Generation Xers’ feel is not undermined by the 
feelings-based approach to life of their generation.  It is part of their desire to 
discover new truths and become who they are.  Older generations must be 
encouraged to see how their alleged ‘transgressions’ can be seen to be attempts 
to find new forms of solidarity in a world that is rapidly changing in so many ways. 
From a Gadamerian perspective, Bildung is a process of encouraging all 
generations toward the good, towards applying impersonal truth to personal truth, 
the old generation’s meta-narratives to Generation X’s counter-narratives, and 
official narratives of the classroom to counter-narrativesof culture.  Phronesis 
(practical knowledge) provides us with the ability to apply what is good in meta-
narratives with what is good in counter-narratives. 
                                                 
15  The postmodern philosopher, J. F. Lyotard states that “in contemporary society and culture – 
postindustrial society, postmodern culture…the grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what 
mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of 
emancipation” (Lyotard 1984, 37). The purpose of meta-narratives is to present the ultimacy of any truth 
accepted by society. According to Lyotard, postmodern is “incredulity toward metanarratives” (Lyotard 
1984, xxiv). Counter-narratives challenge the ‘official’ and ‘hegemonic’ narratives of everyday life that are 
created for specific political purposes. For Lyotard, “counter-narratives are ‘little stories’- the little stories 
of those individuals and groups whose knowledge and histories have been marginalized, excluded, 
subjugated or forgotten in the telling of official narratives” (Peters & Lankshear 1996, 2). 
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For me, the dialogue model of Gadamer as a new mode of ‘enculturation’ 
can be used to describe what should happen when we are engaged in a dialogue 
with different generations.’  It encourages us to seek out those experiences that 
accommodate the tension between commonality and difference or familiarity and 
unfamiliarity.  The forms of such experiences, and the kinds of valued 
relationships that they allow, will be more specifically explored in my final chapter. 
Our generation – our pasts, our traditions, our sources of generation – has very 
much to do with who we are and where we are going.  It has very much to do 
with our enculturation – our fulfillment. 
Concerning the notion of fulfillment, it should be noted that Christian 
educators influenced by Minjung pedagogy have too narrowly reduced phronesis 
to political praxis because of Minjung pedagogy’s tendency to propose political 
praxis as the good.  Many educators of the Boomer generation have encouraged 
oppressed groups to attempt critical readings of what is behind, in, and before 
texts, as a way of helping them to uncover the truth about their political situation.  
Minjung pedagogy as political praxis in Korea seems to be regarded as phronesis.  
Phronesis, however, involves the uniqueness of each individual person much 
more than Minjung pedagogy allows.  In fact, it is precisely because phronesis 
doesn’t exist at the level of the universal, but at the correlation of the universal 
and the particular, that Christian religious educators must take seriously people’s 
own biographical uniqueness as a starting point for pedagogy and as a process 
of doing phronesis.  Gadamer helps us in seeing the interconnectedness of the 
notion of understanding with that of tradition, community, horizons, practical 
knowledge (phronesis), and enculturation.  This helps us to see that real 
understanding is characterized by negativity, openness, relationship, and 
linguisticality.  Such notions all presuppose a relationship of interconnectivity 
between subject and object and suggest that our effective histories are always an 
‘opening up’ to others. 
Such an understanding is tied to a notion of practical knowledge that does 
not involve a human being individually acting upon a norm derived from an 
abstract consciousness.  We are, on the one hand, always concretely dependent 
 58
upon prejudice and, on the other hand, always drawing upon the process of self-
reflection itself.  It is this kind of embodied practice that allows for the on-going 
openness and enhancement of meaning encountered in the hermeneutical 
experience.  It is how members of different generations can learn from each other 
as they grow together through responsibly partaking of life together. 
The Builder and the Boomer generations have become used to 
understanding the Word of God by taking recourse to church dogma.  Systematic 
belief and doctrine come to take precedence over the dynamic hermeneutical 
relationship between the Word and interpreter.  Gadamer’s Bildung aims at ‘self-
education’ as a capability that one gradually learns to embrace as an enduring 
responsibility.  Such responsibility involves questioning and on-going dialogue 
with others.  From a Gadamerian perspective, it might be said that the 
strengthening of our responsibilities with others is related to our interaction with 
the word of God.  In fact, Gadamer’s ideas of ‘understanding’ and ‘practical 
knowledge’ help us to see that our very coming together is a communicative 
achievement. 
Gadamer's notions of the role of negativity, openness, relationship, and 
linguisticality in hermeneutical understanding and experience help us better 
understand the multifaceted relationships between the Word of God and us, 
systematic belief faith and lived faith, subject-object dualities and many aspects 
of pluralities, meta-narratives and mini-narratives.  I believe that such an 
understanding is required if one is to confront that fullness of life wherein all 
generations learn to love and grow together. 
Learning from others through a Bildung that encourages embodied 
engagements with the world will at times necessarily involve confrontation, but it 
will be an educating confrontation-as-engagement, productive of our response-
abilities (our respect for the offering of others).  Such learning will be a learning of 
how we can live full lives, and generate desirable futures together. 
Generation Xers, just as the Builder and Boomer Generations before them, 
have been thrown into the world.  But they have not been abandoned.  Their 
being is realized in the world, in the contexts into which they have been thrown.  
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Those contexts are very much a part of what previous generations – previous 
attempts at understanding – have become.  Religious educators must provide the 
means for all to listen to the ‘demands of concreteness’ that resulted in the 
deliberations and decisions of others. 
The work of Gadamer on understanding – what might be called his 
Dialogue Model – can help us, as Korean Christian religious educators to more 
responsibly do our work in the world.  However, we must heed the voice of the 
many thinkers who criticize Gadamer’s ontology for lacking a critical dimension.  
We must encourage dialogue that illuminates both the process of social and 
cultural reproduction and how our relationships with others are often conditioned 
and delimited by that which is beyond our control. 
It is here that some reflection on the work of Habermas is important. 
Habermas, like Gadamer, is interested in the emancipation of the notions of 
reason, language, and Bildung from the bondage of objectivistic scientism (Shin 
2000, 149).  He does, however, have a very different idea of hermeneutics, one 
that, because of its alleged ‘critical’ component, deserves some attention as an 
entry point to the work of Caputo. 
 For Habermas, the Enlightenment as an intellectual project is very much 
alive.  In fact, he largely assumes the universal value of the traditional liberal 
institutions of the Enlightenment (Borradori 2003, 13).  However, Habermas 
believes that it must regain the critical stance towards history it once had.  He 
believes that philosophy, through a critical, theoretical examination of the 
problems of a modern society, can assume that stance.  The goal of Habermas’ 
critical hermeneutics is “emancipation, regarded as the demand for improvement 
of the present human situation” (Borradori 2003, 15).  Such a demand, for 
Habermas is the ‘unfinished project of modernity.’ 
Habermas, however, argues that the “objectivity of a ‘happening of 
tradition’ that is made up of symbolic meaning is not objective enough” 
(Habermas 1986, 271).  He is of the opinion that a major limitation on 
hermeneutics’ claim to universality is the fact that our traditions are not free of 
power.  For Habermas, this power constitutes a pre-linguistic basis for purposive-
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rational action and that, as a result, hermeneutic experience that confronts such 
“actual conditions changes into critique of ideology” (Habermas 1986, 272). 
Habermas is also convinced that psychoanalysis and the critique of 
ideology are theories of meaning detection that are not based on the Gadamerian 
sublimation of social processes to cultural tradition.  The subjects of both theories 
are neither aware of nor in control of the meaning of their own utterances.  
Habermas’ point is that both psychoanalysis and the critique of ideology are 
concerned with meanings that have been ‘systematically distorted,’ and that a 
non-hermeneutical revealing of ideological statements produced by such 
distortion must precede meaningful conversation. 
Habermas’ critical hermeneutics examines, for example, the 
psychoanalytic claim to reveal distortions produced by the sedimentations of 
consciousness.  Habermas offers a ‘depth hermeneutics’ that is not based on the 
models of translation of traditional hermeneutics but rather on systematic, 
methodological principles.  Depth hermeneutics assumes a distorted 
communication in need of examination and correction.  It is through examining 
the relationship between such a depth hermeneutics and communicative 
competence that Habermas argues for the universality of ‘principles of discourse’ 
(a ‘Discourse Model’) that works towards a common good enhancing 
communicative virtue.  Habermas believes that only a theory of communicative 
competence can account for distortions in communication produced by the 
unconscious or by ideology.  For him, only such a theory adequately responds to 
the fact that social action exceeds the symbolic transmission of meaning. 
With Habermas, I believe that the Bildung of a ‘self-reconstructive public’ 
is enhanced by communicative virtues, procedural principles, and intersubjective 
learning processes.  Habermas explores several principles important for 
educative discourse such as free and equal access, ideal role taking, and respect 
for difference. 
I believe, however, that both Gadamer and Habermas fail to show how the 
concepts of understanding and critical reason are related to the notion of valued 
relationship that I believe is of importance to Christian educators searching to 
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bridge the gap between generations. 
In this connection, I agree with Caputo’s criticism of the over-
rationalizations and over-generalizations that are discernable in Habermas’ 
attempts to resolve the crisis of reason.  Caputo argues, in criticizing such 
Habermasian tendencies, that: 
  
When you start rationalizing, that makes the university happy. If it pleases 
you, I suppose it’s all right. But it is inflation. And inflation is always 
dangerous, not only in economics but also in philosophy. And I think that 
inflation is what you get out of Habermas, and that a good deal of the 
formulations in Post-Cartesian Meditations16are inflated. 
 
No group of people is privileged over any other in having more access to 
universal a priori principles.  As Caputo argues, “Our mutual commitment to 
linguisticality, embodiment, and historicality cuts that off.  All we can do is 
proceed as sensibly as we can, with the aim of minimizing the suffering we inflict 
on one another” (Caputo 1992, 128- 29). 
Even though Gadamer and Habermas both criticize such dualisms of the 
Enlightenment as ‘enlightenment/confusion,’ ‘subject/object,’ ‘science/non-
science,’ and ‘rationality/irrationality,’ their understandings of the essence of the 
Enlightenment are significantly different.  In spite of praising Gadamer for 
founding his hermeneutics on the observation of our communication in natural 
language, Habermas is of the opinion that hermeneutical rationality is not able to 
help us decide upon the ideal foundation of society and politics and that a critical 
reason against authority is needed.  On the other hand, Gadamer emphasizes 
that “the passive and responsive aspect of rationality is more fundamental than 
the critical capacity” (Shin 1994, 150). 
Believing that both Gadamer and Habermas weaken the ground of ethics 
with their assumption of universally valid ways to achieve understanding, Caputo, 
following Derrida, construes hermeneutics as a continuation of the tradition of 
                                                 
16  According to Caputo, Habermas’ “Post-Cartesian Meditations is an attempt to formulate what 
James L. Marsh describes as a ‘critical modernism,’ that is, a philosophical standpoint which remains 
faithful to the essential tendencies of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant and Hegel, while 
tempering the claims of modernity which have taken shape in twentieth-century continental philosophy” 
(Caputo 1992, 1). 
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metaphysics and argues that it must be deconstructed before ethics is possible 
(Shin 1994, 184).  He writes approvingly of Derrida’s deconstruction as ‘radical 
hermeneutics.’  Most importantly, he believes that it is within ‘the difficulty of life’ 
that ethics and ethical responsibility are made possible (Caputo 1987, 209).  It is 
here that the work of Caputo is indispensable. 
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AS CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS EDUCATORS 
 
It has been my claim throughout this thesis that intergenerational action 
and understanding will be made possible and/or enhanced by a pedagogy that is 
fueled by a renewed understanding of the connection between our understanding 
of the world and our valuable relationships. 
Educators imbued with such an understanding confront the fullness of life.  
They do not ‘take sides’ when it comes to the numerous dualities and binary 
oppositions that constitute modern philosophy and Korean society.  Their notion 
of ‘experience’ extends to embodied and ideational confrontation.  According to 
the notion of valuable relationship argued for herein, to experience is to face what 
is never given or present.  It is to experience the unpresentable and the 
impossible.  Experience is a reaching towards our ideal, our God.  It is an attempt 
to establish a relationship with that which is beyond in both space and time. 
The engagement of people and of ideas, however, happens in specific 
historical, socio-cultural and psychophysical situations.  Christian religious 
educators must appreciate the multifaceted contextual aspects to our shared 
world.  Nurturing valuable relationships involves focusing attention on the 
variegated responses that people have to the world that surrounds and 
constitutes them.  Part of this nurturing accordingly places great importance on 
the development of response-abilities, on the development of how, when, where 
and why to respond.  It is a nurturing that enhances our world-making capabilities. 
The development of this responsibility involves learning how to respect 
others as ourselves.  Being attuned to and respecting others allows us to gain 
insight into their effective histories and to see how the world changes around us.  
It thus allows us to transform ourselves.  This sensitivity to the intertwining of self 
and other, and individual and social growth, is an important aspect of the kind of 
valuable relationship I believe Christian religious educators must encourage.  
Such an intertwining is one of the primary reasons why I am sympathetic to an 
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ontological turn that reunites ‘knowing’ and ‘being.’  I believe, however, that such 
a uniting is not a job for theory.  It can only be done as we engage others and the 
world around us, as we turn our valuable relationships into a mutually beneficial 
understanding of the world.  Learning about our world and the multitude of others 
within it is a learning about ourselves, and such learning is necessarily a 
transforming of our ‘individual’ selves and the others through which we come to 
understand ourselves.  Learning about limits to self and other and seeing those 
limits dissolve in time allows us to glimpse one important aspect of 
transcendence. 
Respect for the being of, and attention to the voice of, others is enhanced 
if they are a being to whom we exhibit genuine care.  Caring about others and 
being sensitive to their suffering is an integral part of one’s own self-development, 
one’s own Bildung, one’s own enculturation.  This way of construing things, 
however, is far from an individualistically pragmatic defense of the need for care.  
The road upon which valuable relationships are engaged and developed is a 
road upon which individual selves with insulated and isolated ends cannot be 
found. 
I believe that the relationship between education and theology is best 
construed as an organic one.  It is at the merging of the epistemic, ontic, and 
transcendental that I believe the nature of such a relationship is most obvious.  
Learning to understand meaning has very much to do with the making of 
meaning, not by us as isolated egos, but in concert with others.  Respecting 
others, opening ourselves to others, and allowing our virtuous selves to reign all 
mean the same thing.  They are very much what ‘doing the truth,’ realizing the 
truth, is about.  The ends of truth, all of that which is to come, the transcendent – 
these different ways of giving description to the subject matter of theology offer 
equally suitable descriptions of the subjects of a pedagogy encouraging of those 
valuable relationships that make our mutual enculturation possible. 
A sensitivity to the making of meaning and the suffering of others 
occasions a responsibility in regard to our acts of naming, our deliberations, and 
the purposes of our actions.  It is a responsibility that cannot be properly 
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developed in moments wherein one engages and celebrates the flux of a world in 
transition.  The flux of the world cannot be ignored, but in our very 
acknowledgement of it we must be moving beyond it, moving in a direction that 
has not been charted, and thus which cannot be seen as ‘in flux.’  Others will 
interpret our actions as having a specific purpose regardless of the purpose we 
ourselves may attach to such actions.  Christian religious educators must bear 
this in mind when they enter the worlds of those people whom which they seek to 
help. 
As part of being open to the fullness of life, Christian religious educators 
must be open to the future, to that part of life into which all effects of our 
responses and responsibilities move.  A sense of valuable relationship akin to 
that defended in this thesis appreciates that God is not served in propositions or 
principles or absolutes, but in Spirit, and in a Spirit that moves, and that carries 
us as it moves.  It celebrates the Gospels as dynamic, and thus as productive of 
reality, as leading us into a world that will be different from the world into which 
we have been thrown and which we have struggled to come to know. 
As Christian religious educators, we must celebrate the journey we are on, 
a journey into the (presently) unknown, a journey that will time and time again 
expose us to that which is not certain, a journey upon which we will also change. 
Such an openness to the fullness of life, however, also involves (the 
importance of) a questioning stance so thoroughgoing, so willing to accept the 
place of negativity within reason, that it generates a non-identification with one’s 
own subject position and socio-cultural codes.  This radical non-knowing, this 
acceptance of the abyss, shapes the restless, but passionate, searching heart 
possessed by those with an understanding of the dynamic nature of our valuable 
relationships to others and the world. 
Christian religious educators, of course, have to accept that faith is not 
safe and that life can be a very difficult adventure.  In our very acts of attempted 
apprehension we may do violence as we categorize that which surrounds us.  
The temporal distances that separate us from others, and even our own effective 
histories, may have much suffering in store for us.  The individual who has 
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engaged such relationships, however, will see all such moments as reminders 
that engaging the fullness of life is a kind of engaging that is in constant need of 
refilling, in constant need of nurturing.  She or he will have realized that suffering 
is in the world, but that so too is the possibility of a celebration of the Spirit that 
moves, of the Spirit that is the unfolding of the world, of the Spirit that makes 
possible the blossoming of human beings. 
Christian religious educators must exercise the same care in our 
communication with young and old alike that we dream of them exercising 
towards each other.  If our caring is successful, if our risks undertaken towards a 
life of valuable relationships are productive, our efforts might slowly begin to 
dissolve a binary opposition that had necessitated our encounter -- that between 
‘old’ and ‘young’ generations.  The latter, and the former, will have become a flux 
of individual names, unique stories, and special acts of caring. 
Christian religious educators who have redrawn their notions of 
understanding and valuable relationship in ways that have been suggested in this 
thesis will have gained, I believe, much insight into how to approach the problem 
of intergenerational conflict in Korean society.  They will have helped us not to be 
scared by fact that ‘one generation goes its way, the next generation arrives,’ 
(Ecclesiastes 1:4) and they will have helped us to understand that it is precisely 
because of our interrelatedness that we are all ‘a chosen generation by God’ 
(1 Peter 2:9). 
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